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IT’S NOT JUST ABOUT MIRANDA:
DETERMINING THE VOLUNTARINESS OF
CONFESSIONS IN CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS*
Paul Marcus†
In criminal law, confession evidence is a prosecutor’s
most potent weapon—so potent that . . . “the
introduction of a confession makes the other aspects of a
trial in court superfluous.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2002 in suburban Maryland, just outside of Washington, D.C.,
murder suspect Richard Gater was arrested and interrogated at the
police station. The interviewing officer warned Gater “that if he did not
tell police where to find the gun used in a killing several days earlier,
heavily armed officers could raid the home of Gater’s ailing mother and
possibly slam her on the ground and handcuff her as they looked for the
weapon.” Seen and heard on videotape, the officer’s final comment
before Gater confessed was: “You don’t want to put your family
through this.”2
A decade earlier, in Titusville, Florida, murder suspect Brian
Kennedy was interrogated, and he asked what would happen to him if
he told the police his story. The appeals court later stated: “The
detective asked Kennedy if he had ever heard of immunity and then
proceeded to explain immunity to him. The detective, immediately
realizing that he had made a mistake by mentioning immunity, informed
Kennedy that he, as a police officer, could not grant immunity, but that
the state attorney could.” Kennedy confessed soon thereafter.3

Paul Marcus, 2006.
Haynes Professor of Law. A portion of this paper was delivered at the Valparaiso
University School of Law, A Consideration of Miranda: 40 Years, as part of the Seegers
Distinguished Lecture Series in January, 2005. With thanks to the students and law
faculties of St. John’s University, Valparaiso University, the University of Maryland, and
the College of William and Mary for the many helpful comments made during
presentations.
1
Saul M. Kassin, The Psychology of Confession Evidence, 52 AM. PSYCHOL. 221 (1997).
2
Ruben Casteneda, Interrogation Problems Caught on Video in Md., WASH. POST, Oct. 27,
2003, at B01, available at LEXIS, ALLNWS File.
3
Kennedy v. State, 641 So. 2d 135, 136 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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Just last year, a federal circuit court reversed a trial court’s finding of
an inadmissible confession where the defendant appeared to have been
promised that he would not be prosecuted if he confessed that his killing
of the victim was “spontaneous.”4 The majority relied heavily on the
defendant’s age (mid-fifties), his experience (military veteran, manager
in a real estate office), and his academic background (college education,
one year of law school). In essence, his confession could be viewed as
voluntary because he is “an educated, sophistical individual . . . [who]
had past experience and dealings with . . . investigators.”5
In these cases and in many others, whether the suspects received
Miranda warnings was really not at issue in connection with the
admissibility of their incriminating statements.6 In all three of these
cases, the key question was whether under the circumstances the
statements had been given voluntarily, consistent with the requirements
of the Due Process Clause.7 To many readers, this focus on voluntariness

4
United States v. LeBrun, 363 F.3d 715 (8th Cir. 2004). The transcript from that portion
of the interrogation states:
Lebrun: So, am I hearing that I won’t be prosecuted?
I (interrogator): That’s what you are hearing.
LeBrun: Is that what I am hearing?
I: That’s what you are hearing.
I: If it’s . . . spontaneous and that’s the truth, you will not be
prosecuted.
I: That’s absolutely right.
LeBrun: I am here to tell you there was no premeditation.
I: All right.
LeBrun: It was spontaneous
I: Okay
I: So it was, let me get this clear. It was spontaneous?
LeBrun: Correct.
Id. at 725.
5
Id. at 723. The dissenting judges were vigorous in their disagreement with the
majority, writing that in addition to making a false promise to the defendant the
government agents “interrupted Mr. LeBrun in a bullying manner and demonstrated a
threatening kind of impatience with him.” Id. at 727.
6
See generally LeBrun, 363 F.3d 715; Kennedy, 641 So. 2d 135.
7
Gater’s statement was excluded, with the judge ruling that the government “cannot
threaten the family members of the defendant, you may not threaten the defendant and
you can have no coercion, promises or threats.” Without the incriminating statement, the
jury acquitted Gater of first degree murder but convicted him of second degree murder.
The judge strongly chastised the government, for the officer’s conduct constituted a threat
“directed against the defendant’s loved ones under circumstances in which he is under
arrest and unable to protect them.” See Casteneda, supra note 2.
Kennedy’s murder conviction was affirmed on appeal, with the majority
acknowledging that while Kennedy had been “sold a bill of goods” as to immunity, he had
not been coerced into confessing. The lone dissent sharply disagreed, stating that
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in the confession process—apart from Miranda—may come as a surprise.
The common assumption is often made that, however debatable Miranda
may be, it has had a definitive impact and has essentially eliminated the
need to consider the messy and ineffective rules regarding voluntariness
in the interrogation process that were in play before 1966.8 However, the
reality of voluntary interrogation is not nearly so simple or concrete.
The importance of Miranda cannot be misstated. It has had nothing
short of a revolutionary impact on the way in which we look at the
validity of interrogations in individual criminal prosecutions. While
Miranda has had a great number of severe critics,9 when it is coupled
with Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel10 and Fourth Amendment
Search and Seizure considerations,11 the United States is indeed quite
“Kennedy was induced to confess and even the slightest promise of a bargain is sufficient
to invalidate a confession.” 641 So. 2d at 140.
8
Many have written of the major problems in this area prior to Miranda, and several
thoughtful analysts come to mind. Lawrence Herman described the matter well:
It violates due process of law for the prosecution in a criminal case to
use the defendant’s involuntary confession against him. Whether a
confession is involuntary must be determined by considering the
totality of the circumstances – the characteristics of the defendant and
the environment and technique of interrogation. Under the “totality of
the circumstances” approach, virtually everything is relevant and
nothing is determinative. If you place a premium on clarity, this is not
a good sign. The point is that the Miranda dissenters in 1966 and the
Attorney General in 1985 were simply wrong in their claim that we got
along well with the law that antedated Miranda.
Lawrence Herman, The Supreme Court, the Attorney General, and the Good Old Days of Police
Interrogation, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 745 (1987). Catherine Hancock was more succinct:
“[T]he Court’s Due Process decisions . . . [speak] of ‘coercion’ and the ‘totality’ test as
though they were unchanging anchors of thought.” Catherine Hancock, Due Process Before
Miranda, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2195, 2237 (1996). Yale Kamisar has been the foremost
commentator in the area. He wrote bluntly of the problem in Confessions, Search and Seizure,
and the Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA L.J., 465, 471 (1999) (“The pre-Miranda voluntariness test
was too mushy, subjective, and unruly to provide suspects with adequate protection.”); see
also Yale Kamisar, What is an “Involuntary” Confession?, 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 728 (1963).
9
For an overview of the concerns as to Miranda being too broad or not broad enough,
see, e.g., Alfredo Garcia, Is Miranda Dead, Was It Overruled, or Is It Irrelevant?, 10 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 461 (1998); Paul Marcus, A Return to the “Bright Line” Rule of Miranda, 35
WM. & MARY L. REV. 93 (1993); Christopher Slobogin, Toward Taping, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
309 (2003); George C. Thomas, Miranda’s Illusion: Telling Stories in the Police Interrogation
Room, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1091, 1093 (2003).
10
Under the counsel provision, police may not engage in questioning of a suspect—even
one not under arrest or in custody—without notice to the suspect and her attorney.
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). However, this deceptively powerful rule
applies in a relatively few number of cases, for the Sixth Amendment is in force only once
the defendant has been formally charged. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
11
A search issue is found when an action by the government that violates the Fourth
Amendment results in an incriminating statement. The question then is whether that
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different from that which existed four decades ago. The question
remains whether the voluntariness standard has become essentially
irrelevant or of minimal importance as a result.12
This Article seeks to answer several key questions:13 Are the
voluntariness rules still being broadly litigated? Do they have weight in
many major cases, or are they of note simply in fringe areas? Finally, is
the law regarding voluntariness any better than it was before Miranda,
and is there now more certainty for law enforcement personnel, lawyers,
and judges? This Article does not seek to extend the earlier, thoughtful
proposals that had been made as to ways in which more definite
standards and rules could be used.14 Also, this Article does not seek to
determine whether current Fifth Amendment law results in serious
consequences as to innocent parties confessing or the police being
unduly handicapped in the investigative process.15 Rather, the purpose
of this Article is to evaluate the law on voluntariness. To accomplish
this, I have reviewed every reported state and federal appeals decision

statement is tainted by the earlier illegality. If so, the statement must by excluded as
evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Paradis, 351 F.3d 21, 34 (1st Cir. 2003); United States v.
Reed, 349 F.3d 457, 463–65 (7th Cir. 2003); State v. Maraschiello, 88 S.W.3d 586, 600 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 2000); Moss v. State, 75 S.W.3d 132, 139 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
12
One observer wrote that “[a]lthough Miranda has largely replaced the involuntary
confession rule, the latter still exists; it was not overruled by Miranda.” Herman, supra note
8, at 752. The Supreme Court, in its tepid reaffirmation of Miranda in Dickerson v. United
States, discussed the voluntariness principles. 530 U.S. 428 (2000). The Justices stated that
the voluntariness test “is more difficult than Miranda for law enforcement officers to
conform to, and for courts to apply in a consistent manner.” For a highly critical view of
the voluntariness test, see Mark Godsey, Rethinking the Involuntary Confession Rule: Toward
a Workable Test for Identifying Compelled Self-Incrimination, 93 CAL. L. REV. 465 (2005).
13
Juan Carlos Alarcon, Stacy Haney, Virginia Vile, Kristine Wolfe, and Laura Wright all
provided outstanding research assistance.
14
The late Professor Welsh White of the University of Pittsburgh Law School laid out a
number of careful proposals over the past twenty-five years. See Welsh S. White,
Confessions in Capital Cases, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 979 (2003); Welsh S. White, Miranda’s Failure
to Restrain Pernicious Interrogation Practices, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1211 (2001); Welsh S. White,
What is an Involuntary Confession Now?, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 2001 (1998) [hereinafter White,
What is an Involuntary Confession]; Welsh S. White, Police Trickery in Inducing Confessions, 127
U. PA. L. REV. 581 (1979) [hereinafter White, Police Trickery]. Deception in the questioning
of suspects has been hotly debated. See Robert P. Mosteller, Moderating Investigative Lies by
Disclosure and Documentation, 76 OR. L. REV. 833 (1997); Margaret L. Paris, Lying to Ourselves,
76 OR. L. REV. 817 (1997); Christopher Slobogin, Deceit, Pretext, and Trickery: Investigate Lies
by the Police, 76 OR. L. REV. 775 (1997); Deborah Young, Unnecessary Evil: Police Lying in
Interrogations, 28 CONN. L. REV. 425 (1996). The law regarding deception and voluntariness
is discussed, infra Part III.A.
15
Compare the views taken in Steven D. Clymer, Are Police Free to Disregard Miranda?,
112 YALE L.J. 447 (2002), with Laurie Magid, Deceptive Police Interrogation Practices: How Far
is too Far?, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1168 (2001).
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on voluntariness of the past twenty years. Tens of thousands of opinions
dealing with confessions in criminal cases were examined, a good
number of which mentioned voluntariness, but they did not truly
explore the due process principles.16 Ultimately, I have read a few
thousand opinions on point, dating from 1985 to present.17
The forthcoming Parts show that the key conclusions can be stated
concisely. The voluntariness considerations remain a major matter in
criminal prosecutions, and the substantive law in this area has not
improved or become more definite over the past four decades. To that
end, the analysis will begin with several major United States Supreme
Court decisions and then look to the way in which state and federal
judges continue to construe and apply those decisions.
II. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT SPEAKS
The United States Supreme Court has contemplated issues regarding
the admissibility of confessions in criminal cases under the voluntariness
standard numerous times in the modern era. Most of these cases have
focused on the application of the basic standard for consideration to
particular fact patterns. However, in three opinions the Justices sought
to give broader guidance.18

16
The problem often focused on whether a Miranda waiver was voluntary. While this
point is related to the broad voluntariness issue and is often resolved in similar fashion, it
involves a distinct and different analysis. See, e.g., Hopkins v. Cockrell, 325 F.3d 579, 584–
85 (5th Cir. 2003); State v. Mortley, 532 N.W.2d 498, 502–03 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995).
17
The substantive state cases numbered well over 1500. The federal cases were more
difficult to break out in terms of precise numbers, for the discussions often were bound up
with habeas corpus procedures, application of Miranda to non-confession issues (such as
the discovery of later evidence), ineffective assistance of counsel, fruit of the poisonous tree
applications, etc. However, it is fair to conclude that there were many hundreds of federal
decisions discussing voluntariness during this time period. At the United States Supreme
Court level, the volume was not high, with much more emphasis being placed on the Fifth
and Sixth Amendment issues in connection with confessions. Still, over the past twenty
years, more than a dozen opinions have discussed, at least to a limited extent,
voluntariness. Of course, even all of these figures do not fully lay out actual cases in which
the voluntariness claim is raised. I only reviewed reported appellate decisions. Also, cases
in which the defendant was acquitted, otherwise prevailed at or before trial, or did not
bring up the question on appeal are not part of this process.
18
Which is not to suggest that numerous other opinions from the Court were not of
consequence; they certainly mattered a great deal. See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530
U.S. 428 (2000) (reaffirming Miranda with a notation that it provided greater certainty as a
standard than did the voluntariness test); Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991)
(allowing an involuntary confession into evidence could be viewed as harmless error);
Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986) (holding that the defense can offer evidence to the
jury on whether admissible confession was “unworthy of belief”); Lynumn v. Illinois, 372
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A. Bram v. United States19
More than a century ago, the Supreme Court expressed concern with
the interrogation process and the Due Process Clause. In Bram, the Court
sought “to guard against the inherently coercive atmosphere of a police
interrogation and its effect on an accused’s exercise of his constitutional
rights.”20 The following language in Bram was frequently relied upon
throughout the twentieth Century, especially prior to the 1980s, and it
still gets quoted on occasion: “[A] confession, in order to be admissible,
must be free and voluntary: that is, it must not be extracted by any sort
of threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied promises,
however slight.”21
The greatest reach of this notion would be to take it literally so that
any degree of inducement would be sufficient to invalidate an otherwise
permissible statement by the defendant. Not surprisingly, very few
courts have ever followed such an interpretation.22 Instead, the modern
view of the statement is that threats and promises are to be taken
seriously but that these are rarely determinative on their own. If such
evidence is present, the court must view that inducement along with
other key factors in determining if the resulting statement was given

U.S. 528 (1963) (addressing a situation of undue pressure on a mother where police
suggested that involvement with her children was at stake in the process); Brown v.
Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (setting forth one of the earliest discussions of voluntariness
regarding shocking torture and threats against suspect). Still, while these cases and many
others remain significant, the three presented in the text appear to have had the greatest
impact on the widest range of prosecutions throughout the nation.
19
168 U.S. 532 (1897).
20
Taylor v. Singletary, 148 F.3d 1276, 1282 (11th Cir. 1998).
21
168 U.S. at 561.
22
To be sure, the United States Supreme Court itself has, from time to time, repeated the
statement from Bram. See, e.g., Hutto v. Ross, 429 U.S. 28, 30 (1976). But see Arizona v.
Fulminante, 360 U.S. 315 (1959). As explained in People v. Vasila:
The Attorney General urges us to conclude that . . . officers are
permitted to induce a confession by making promises, so long as they
keep them. This is not the law. . . . The California Supreme Court has
never distinguished between promises of leniency based on whether
the promises were kept. The issue is not whether a commitment was
honored, but rather whether governmental agents have coerced a
citizen to give testimony against himself. When the government does
so, it deprives that citizen of a right assured to him by the Fifth
Amendment. Whether the coercion is based on a promise kept or
repudiated can only truly be tested in hindsight, but it constitutes
coercion under either scenario.
45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 355, 360–61 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995). See generally State v. Osborn, 547 N.W.2d
139, 145–46 (Neb. 1996). For a critical view of Bram, see Godsey, supra note 12.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol40/iss3/4

Marcus: It's Not Just About Miranda: Determining the Voluntariness of Co

2006]

Voluntariness of Confessions

607

voluntarily.23 As explained by one court, the key question is whether the
inducement is “so attractive as to render a confession involuntary.”24
Consequently, in most jurisdictions there is no true per se rule banning
confessions that occur after a promise or threat is made. Rather, courts
evaluate the inducement and the other “circumstances surrounding the
confession [to determine if there are] indicia of voluntariness.”25
B. Spano v. New York26
The United States Supreme Court has consistently recognized the
grave difficulties raised by issues of improper interrogation techniques,
which arguably result in involuntary confessions in criminal
prosecutions. The starting point is whether such a confession is “the
product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice, made by the
subject at a time when that person’s will was not overborne.”27
However, the competing interest that the Court has repeatedly
emphasized is that confessions are “essential to society’s compelling
interest in finding, convicting, and punishing those who violate the
law.”28
The most significant decision by the Supreme Court that clarified the
importance of balancing these important considerations was written
almost a half century ago in Spano.29 Vincent Joseph Spano was an
Italian immigrant convicted of murder in New York. The Spano decision
is significant because it explored these two conflicting positions in great
detail,30 and contrary to other decisions, it did not involve a situation in
which physical force or the threat of force was present.31

See infra Part IV for a detailed discussion of the standard. See generally Marquez v.
State, 890 P.2d 980, 986 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995).
24
United States v. Johnson, 351 F.3d 254, 261 (6th Cir. 2003).
25
Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 686 (4th Cir. 2001). The Supreme Court has written that the
“passage from Bram . . . does not state the standard for determining the voluntariness of a
confession.” Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 285 (1991).
26
360 U.S. 315 (1959).
27
As stated by the Iowa Supreme Court in State v. Bowers, 661 N.W.2d 536, 541 (Iowa
2003).
28
Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426 (1986).
29
360 U.S. 315 (1959).
30
“[W]e are forced to resolve a conflict between two fundamental interests of society; its
interest in prompt and efficient law enforcement, and its interest in preventing the rights of
its individual members from being abridged by unconstitutional methods of law
enforcement.” Id. at 315.
31
The Supreme Court has never wavered in its view that the use of violence or the
threat of physical harm will virtually ensure that any resulting confession will be found to
23
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As the Court noted, Spano was of foreign descent. He had no prior
experience with the criminal justice system.32 A friend of Spano’s, a
police cadet, pretended to befriend him and then berated him when
Spano was reluctant to confess.33 The Court stated that Spano had a
history of emotional instability, that he was held for an extended time,
and that instead of making a narrative statement, he “was subject to the
leading questions of a skillful prosecutor in a question and answer
confession.”34 There was heavy pressure, certainly, but it fell far short of
the physical force or threat seen in earlier cases. Recognizing that “the
actions of police in obtaining confessions have come under scrutiny in a
long series of cases,”35 the Justices looked to all of these factors and
decided that the resulting confession was involuntary because Spano’s

be involuntary. See, e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991); Malinski v. New York,
324 U.S. 401 (1944). As written in Stein v. New York:
[T]here is no need to weigh or measure its effects on the will of the
individual victim. The tendency of the innocent, as well as the guilty,
to risk remote results of a false confession rather than suffer immediate
pain is so strong that judges long ago found it necessary to guard
against miscarriages of justice by treating any confession made
concurrently with torture or threat of brutality as too untrustworthy to
be received as evidence of guilt.
346 U.S. 156, 182 (1953). This strong view has been followed throughout the nation. See,
e.g., United States v. McCullah, 76 F.3d 1087, 1101 (10th Cir. 1996); Cooper v. Scroggy, 845
F.2d 1385, 1391–92 (6th Cir. 1988); Hinton v. Snyder, 203 F. Supp. 2d 934, 941 (N.D. Ill.
2002); People v. Woods, 703 N.E.2d 35, 44 (Ill. 1998); Haak v. State, 695 N.E.2d 944, 948 (Ind.
1998); Zuliani v. State, 903 S.W.2d 812, 820–21 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995); State v. Smith, 410
S.E.2d 269, 272 (W. Va. 1991). Some courts note that if physical force is used, the officers
must “back off before interrogating [the suspect].” United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455,
1467 (10th Cir. 1993). Other courts write that in determining voluntariness “the need for
. . . an individual calculus is obviated by the egregiousness of the custodian’s conduct.
Indeed, confessions accompanied by physical violence wrought by the police have been
considered per se inadmissible.” United States v. Jenkins, 938 F.2d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 1991).
While there are certainly opinions allowing for the use of force in the interrogation
process, they are few in number and tend to be quite limited in scope. See, e.g., Leon v.
State, 410 So. 2d 201 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982). Leon involved officers that twisted the
suspect’s arm and choked him until he revealed where the victim was being held. The
resulting statement was admissible because the purpose of the force was to find the victim,
not to build the case against the suspect. Id. Overwhelmingly, the courts strongly
condemn any use of coercion, whether or not physical in nature. Blackburn v. Alabama,
361 U.S. 199, 206 (1960); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 559 (1954); Chambers v. Florida, 309
U.S. 227, 237 (1940).
32
360 U.S. 315, 321–22 (1959).
33
Leading to the Chief Justice’s remark that the defendant “was apparently unaware of
John Gay’s famous couplet: ‘An open foe may prove a curse, But a pretended friend is
worse.’” Id. at 323.
34
Id. at 322.
35
Id. at 321.
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“will was overborne by official pressure, fatigue, and sympathy falsely
aroused.”36
The language of the Spano Court condemning the law enforcement
actions is powerful indeed:
The abhorrence of society to the use of involuntary
confessions does not turn alone on their inherent
untrustworthiness. It also turns on the deep-rooted
feeling that the police must obey the law while enforcing
the law; that in the end life and liberty can be as much
endangered from illegal methods used to convict those
thought to be criminals as from the actual criminals
themselves.37
C. Colorado v. Connelly38
If the majority in Spano was highly critical of the government and its
opinion potentially expansive in scope, both the tone and reach of
judicial scrutiny was scaled back considerably in Connelly.39 At the
outset, it is important to note that the harsh language of Chief Justice
Warren directed against law enforcement in the earlier opinion was
certainly not present in the statement of Chief Justice Rehnquist in
Connelly. The Court’s conclusion was that police action in such cases will
be problematic only if the interrogation, taken as a whole, is “so
offensive to a civilized system of justice that [it] must be condemned.”40
However, it is important to note the unusual factual setting in
Connelly. In Connelly, the defendant approached a police officer to talk
about a murder. Although the officer advised the defendant of his
Miranda rights, the defendant immediately confessed, and he provided
details regarding the murder. These details helped prove a previously
unsolved murder. Later, the defendant became disoriented and spoke of
hearing voices that directed him to confess to the murder. Initially, the
defendant was found incompetent to stand trial. Subsequently, he was
allowed to stand trial even though a psychiatrist stated that Connelly
was suffering from schizophrenia and was in a psychotic state the day he
confessed. The state courts found that his confession was involuntary
36
37
38
39
40

Id. at 323.
Id. at 320–21.
479 U.S. 157 (1986).
See generally id.
Id. at 163.
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because it was “not the product of a rational intellect and a free will.”41
The judges were persuaded that the defendant’s mental illness disrupted
his ability to make a free and rational choice.42
At no point in the litigation did anyone allege that the police
engaged in any coercive tactics directed against Connelly or that the
officers’ action somehow caused Connelly to confess.43 Moreover, when
the suspect confessed, the officers were not aware that he was suffering
from a serious mental disorder, and they did nothing to exploit that
disorder.44 Thus, the Supreme Court decided that the state court ruling
of involuntariness was erroneous. The crucial missing connection was
any improper action on the part of the government officers: “Absent
police conduct causally related to the confession, there is simply no basis
for concluding that any state actor has deprived a criminal defendant of
due process of law.”45
The Supreme Court reasoned that the “police overreaching”
requirement was the central feature of confession cases that it had
decided for decades.46 Moreover, without such a mandated causal link
or connection, the majority reasoned that trial judges would face the
impossible task of making “sweeping inquiries into the state of mind of a
criminal defendant who has confessed, inquiries quite divorced from any
coercion brought to bear on the defendant by the State.”47
After Connelly, the causal connection became essential, even in cases
in which the defendant had been subject to improper police investigatory
action.48 While some assert that this holding has delicately but
702 P.2d 722, 728 (Colo. 1985).
For good discussions of this aspect of the case, see State v. Bravo, 762 P.2d 1318, 1324
(Ariz. 1988), and Smetana v. State, 991 S.W.2d 42, 48 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
43
A point well made in White, What is an Involuntary Confession, supra note 14, at 2017.
44
Connelly, 479 U.S. at 165.
45
Id. at 164.
46
Id. at 163.
47
Id. at 167.
48
Judges have been vigilant in following the Court’s ruling. See, e.g., United States v.
Bell, 367 F.3d 452, 461 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that the defendant “must demonstrate that
[the confession] resulted from coercive police conduct and that there was a link between
the coercive conduct of the police and his confession”); United States v. Lugo, 170 F.3d 996,
1004 (10th Cir. 1999) (“[A] confession is only involuntary when ‘the police use coercive
activity to undermine the suspect’s ability to exercise his free will.’”); United States v.
Montgomery, 14 F.3d 1189, 1195 (7th Cir. 1994) (“[T]here still must be some showing of
official coercion.”); People v. Valdez, 969 P.2d 208, 212 (Colo. 1998) (“A necessary
prerequisite to a conclusion of involuntariness is a finding that the police conduct in
question was coercive.”); State v. Fee, 26 P.3d 40, 47 (Idaho Ct. App. 2001) (“[W]e will
assess only police conduct causally related to the defendant’s confession.”); Jackson v.
41
42
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powerfully shifted the crucial focus from an individual’s voluntary state
of mind and behavior to the government’s improper action, this is the
criteria used overwhelmingly throughout the nation. As a result, under
the federal Constitution and most state constitutions, judges cannot
seriously entertain a claim of involuntariness when considering a
confession unless there is some evidence of official overreaching that
actually caused the suspect to incriminate herself.49
III. DETERMINING VOLUNTARINESS
There is currently little debate in the United States today on the
standard used to determine the admissibility of confessions under the
Due Process Clause. All agree that the voluntariness test was, and is
likely to remain, the test to be used by trial judges. In applying the
voluntariness test, several key factors have been emphasized over the
past few decades. This Article will next examine those factors in order to
determine whether the Supreme Court mandate has been faithfully
followed within our courts.
A. Deception
1.

The Rule

This Part is not intended to track the incredibly large number of
cases in which interrogating officers have successfully used deceit to
elicit an incriminating statement because other scholars have already

State, 735 N.E.2d 1146, 1153 (Ind. 2000) (requiring the defendant to allege some “violence,
threats, promises, or other improper influences”); Martin v. State, 686 A.2d 1130, 1144 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1996) (“[T]he governmental conduct itself, no matter how outrageous, is of
only indirect legal significance and matters only to the extent that it is determined to have
been the catalytic agent that effectively produced the confession.”); State v. Sabinash, 574
N.W.2d 827, 829 (N.D. 1998) (“Coercion, in and of itself, does not invalidate a confession.”);
McGregor v. State, 885 P.2d 1366, 1378 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994) (“Even if McGregor was
insane, his confession is voluntary absent actual police coercion.”); State v. Hoppe, 661
N.W.2d 407, 415 (Wis. 2003) (“[T]here must be police conduct causally related to the
confession for the confession to be considered involuntary.”).
49
Consider the interesting thoughts of Judge Posner in United States v. Rutledge:
The [voluntariness, free will] formula is not taken seriously. Connelly
may have driven the stake through its heart by holding that a
confession which is not a product of the defendant’s free choice—
maybe he was so crazy, retarded, high on drugs, or intoxicated that he
did not even know he was being interrogated—is admissible so long as
whatever it was that destroyed the defendant’s power of choice was
not police conduct.
900 F.2d 1127, 1129 (7th Cir. 1990).
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done that.50 Rather, this Part lays out an array of cases to provide a sense
of the law that has arguably turned out to be extremely favorable to the
government. The sole area of deception that has given judges some
serious pause—lies about the legal system and the law—will also be
explored.
One begins here with a central truth: Police are permitted to lie to
suspects during the interrogation. This view is the basis for all
discussion in the area.51 “[D]eceit and subterfuge are within the ‘bag of
tricks’ that police may use in interrogating suspects.”52 “[M]ere trickery
alone will not necessarily invalidate a confession.”53 Deception is “not
alone sufficient to render a confession inadmissible.”54 The United States
Supreme Court has upheld this proposition, and virtually every state has
supported the Supreme Court’s holding. 55
Indeed, it is rather stunning to see the enormous number of cases in
which confessions were held to be valid. Yet, judges found that
government officials lied to defendants about significant matters
resulting in incriminating statements. Police have lied about matters
such as the following: witnesses against the defendant,56 earlier
statements by a now-deceased victim,57 an accomplice’s willingness to
testify,58 whether the victim had survived an assault,59 “scientific”

50
For an excellent overview, see Young, supra note 14; see also MODEL CODE OF PREARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 140.4 cmt. at 353–58 (1975).
51
On this point there is hardly a dissenting view. For two courts that have expressed
concern, see United States v. Orso, 266 F.3d 1030, 1039 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[M]isrepresenting a
piece of the evidence . . . [is] reprehensible.”), and State v. Register, 476 S.E.2d 153, 158 (S.C.
1996) (“The misrepresentation of evidence by police is a deplorable practice.”). Still, in
both cases the later confessions were allowed into evidence.
52
State v. Schumacher, 37 P.3d 6, 13–14 (Idaho Ct. App. 2001).
53
United States v. Bell, 367 F.3d 452, 461 (5th Cir. 2004).
54
People v. McNeil, 711 N.Y.S.2d 518, 520 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000). The court in Sheriff v.
Bessey explained: “Cases throughout the country support the general rule that confessions
obtained through the use of subterfuge are not vitiated so long as the methods used are
not of a type reasonably likely to procure an untrue statement.” 914 P.2d 618, 620 (Nev.
1996).
55
The most famous case is likely Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969), where a confession
was allowed even though the police lied in telling the defendant that his partner in the
crime had already confessed to committing that crime. See generally White, Police Trickery,
supra note 14.
56
United States v. Orso, 266 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2001); Conner v. State, 982 S.W.2d 655
(Ark. 1998).
57
Rodriquez v. State, 934 S.W.2d 881 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
58
United States v. Ceballos, 302 F.3d 679 (7th Cir. 2002); State v. Simons, 944 S.W.2d 165
(Mo. 1997).
59
People v. Fordan, 597 N.Y.S.2d 807 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993).
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evidence available,60 including DNA61 and fingerprint evidence,62 and
the degree to which the investigating officer identified and sympathized
with the defendant.63
For the Supreme Court Justices and judges throughout the nation, no
matter the nature of the deception, with one major exception, the issue
relates entirely to whether the lies “tend to produce inherently unreliable
statements.”64
Or, as another court stated, whether the “police
misrepresentations . . . [are] sufficiently egregious to overcome a
defendant’s will so as to render a confession involuntary.”65 This point is
made even in connection with the awkward use of polygraph
examinations to elicit an incriminating response.
The awkward situations involving polygraph examinations normally
involve government officers—seemingly independent of the police
department itself—administering a “scientific” test, and then confronting
the suspect with the supposed results of the test. One might consider
telling a suspect that she has lied to be coercive.66 Yet, the vast majority
of courts that have reviewed this technique have allowed it, with most
noting that while the technique should be viewed as a factor “in
determining whether there was impermissible coercion,” it is not
inherently coercive by itself.67 This judgment is made even when the
operator of the equipment advises the defendant that the machine is
“infallible”68 or engages in “moral urging” to assure a confession.69

State v. Bays, 716 N.E.2d 1126 (Ohio 1999).
Conde v. State, 860 So. 2d 930, 944 (Fla. 2003).
62
Lucero v. Kerby, 133 F.3d 1299 (10th Cir. 1998); State v. Davila, 908 P.2d 581 (Idaho Ct.
App. 1995).
63
Mason v. State, 116 S.W.3d 248, 260 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (dealing with a situation
where the officer “misled appellant into believing [officer] was a pedophile”).
64
Sheriff v. Bessey, 914 P.2d 618, 622 (Nev. 1996).
65
State v. Buntin, 51 P.3d 37, 42 (Utah Ct. App. 2002); see also State v. Welker, 932 P.2d
928, 931 (Idaho 1997).
66
A few courts have held that the resulting confessions violate due process. See
Martinez v. State, 545 So. 2d 466, 467 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (“[T]he polygraphist exerted
improper influence over Martinez by emphasizing that both the polygraph results and the
state’s witnesses would contradict his story, and by telling him that he was going to wind
up in a problem.”); State v. Craig, 864 P.2d 1240, 1242 (Mont. 1993) (“We . . . condemn the
use of the results of polygraph examinations to elicit or coerce a confession from
defendants.”).
67
Smith v. State, 797 So. 2d 503, 525 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000) (quotation marks omitted);
see also United States v. Haswood, 350 F.3d 1024, 1029 (9th Cir. 2003); People v. Cipriano,
429 N.W.2d 781, 795 (Mich. 1988); People v. Cannady, 663 N.Y.S.2d 244, 245 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1997).
68
People v. Henson, 692 N.Y.S.2d 778, 779 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999).
60
61
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Physical Evidence

Some judges, while affirming the ability of the police to lie during
the interrogation process, have resisted allowing the government to
falsify physical evidence such as reports and videotapes. In State v.
Cayward,70 the leading case in this area, the police fabricated two
scientific reports, including one from a DNA lab. Most recently, a New
Jersey court struck down a confession when the police made an
audiotape in which an officer posed as an eyewitness and appeared to
give information in the interview that incriminated the defendant.71
Courts have viewed physical evidence as simply different from, and
more coercive in nature than, lies during a conversation.72 As stated by
the court in Cayward:
We think . . . that both the suspect’s and the public’s
expectations concerning the built-in adversariness of
police interrogations do not encompass the notion that
the police will knowingly fabricate tangible
documentation or physical evidence against an
individual. . . . [T]he manufacturing of false documents
by police officials offends our traditional notions of due
process. . . .
[M]anufactured documents have the

69
Gomes v. State, 9 S.W.3d 373, 378 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Other police practices can
be especially telling, particularly when the court views them as having a cumulative impact
on the suspect. See, e.g., State v. Grey, 907 P.2d 951 (Mont. 1995) (regarding lies about
which people police would be interviewing, the extent of the theft problem, the value of
property taken, and the use of a video camera). Generally, though, the multiple practices
situation will be viewed as part of a “totality of circumstances” analysis. See infra Part IV.
70
552 So. 2d 971 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
71
State v. Patton, 826 A.2d 783 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2003). In reality, the situation was
more complicated. Here the tape was used to induce the confession, and it was also offered
at trial to establish the context of the confession and demonstrate that it was voluntarily
given. Id.
72
One court stated:
Understanding that law enforcement needs some latitude in fighting
crime, this court should permit police to use verbal deception but
prohibit their use of falsehoods or deception in written or other
tangible form, such as falsified lab tests, witness statements, or
doctored photographs. This strikes an appropriate balance between
the necessity for the police to use some deception in developing
evidence, while prohibiting the carrying of such deception or
falsehoods to a truly unfair advantage over an accused.
Sheriff v. Bessey, 914 P.2d 618, 622 (Nev. 1996) (Rose, J., dissenting).
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potential of indefinite life and the facial appearance of
authenticity.73
Still, many courts are reluctant to establish such a “bright-line test
dictating that verbal lying in interrogation is allowed, but fabrication of
documents is forbidden.”74 For these courts, the question remains: With
the falsified documents, is this considered action that would “have
induced a false confession”?75
3.

Deceptions About the Legal Process

Understandably, courts historically have been concerned about
officers lying to the suspect about the legal process during interrogation.
If one were to accept such behavior, real concerns surface about
sabotaging of the entire system. This appears to be the view of the
Supreme Court in Lynumn v. Illinois.76
In Lynumn, the officers
misrepresented to the suspect several times that if she did not confess,
government benefits would be withdrawn and the suspect might not be
able to see her children. The suspect subsequently confessed; however,
she later challenged the voluntariness finding made by the trial court:
“The only reason I had for admitting it to the police was
the hope of saving myself from going to jail and being
taken away from my children. The statement I made to
the police after they promised that they would intercede
for me, the statements admitting the crime, were
Cayward, 552 So. 2d at 974. In State v. Farley, the court stated:
We do not believe that merely telling the defendant that he did not do
well on a polygraph examination without further elaboration is likely
to encourage an innocent person to confess. Had the police
intentionally fabricated more specific false results to obtain a
confession, our view may very well be different. This is particularly
true if the police had reduced these fabrications to a written report and
disclosed it to the defendant. We definitely draw a demarcating line
between police deception generally, which does not render a
confession involuntary per se, and the manufacturing of false
documents by the police which “has no place in our criminal justice
system.”
452 S.E.2d 50, 60 n.13 (W. Va. 1994).
74
Bessey, 914 P.2d at 622.
75
Id. In Whittington v. State, the court stated: “We reject [defendant’s] contention that
police deception with regard to the use of bogus scientific procedures is inherently more
coercive than other forms of deception.” 809 A.2d 721, 734 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002); see
also State v. Von Dohlen, 471 S.E.2d 689 (S.C. 1996); Arthur v. Commonwealth, 480 S.E.2d
749 (Va. Ct. App. 1997).
76
372 U.S. 528 (1963).
73
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false. . . . My statement to the police officers that I sold
the marijuana to Zeno was false. I lied to the police at
that time. I lied because the police told me they were
going to send me to jail for 10 years and take my
children, and I would never see them again; so I agreed
to say whatever they wanted me to say.”77
The Court’s language was succinct but direct: “We think it clear that
a confession made under such circumstances must be deemed not
voluntary, but coerced. That is the teaching of our cases.”78
Cases such as Lynumn have led some courts to attempt to develop a
bright line rule concerning deceptions about the legal process during
interrogation. The leading opinion is by the Hawaii Supreme Court,
which distinguished between intrinsic and extrinsic falsehoods to
demonstrate permissible action by the government:79
[E]mployment by the police of deliberate falsehoods
intrinsic to the facts of the alleged offense in question
will be treated as one of the totality of circumstances
surrounding the confession or statement to be
considered in assessing its voluntariness; on the other
hand, deliberate falsehoods extrinsic to the facts of the
alleged offense, which are of a type reasonably likely to
procure an untrue statement or to influence the accused
to make a confession regardless of guilt, will be
regarded as coercive per se, thus obviating the need for a
“totality of circumstances” analysis of voluntariness.80
Examples of potentially permissible intrinsic falsehoods normally
focus on the evidence assembled against the suspect, while
impermissible extrinsic falsehoods typically look to the assurance of
more favorable treatment or the consequences of a particular conviction
or admission.81
The harshest judicial language is usually found in cases in which
police officers tell suspects that if they confess they will be released
Id. at 532.
Id. at 534.
79
State v. Kelekolio, 849 P.2d 58, 73 (Haw. 1993); see also Cole v. State, 923 P.2d 820, 830
(Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
80
As explained in Sheriff v. Bessey, 914 P.2d 618, 620 (Nev. 1996) (quoting Kelekolio, 849
P.2d at 73).
81
United States v. Salisbury, 966 F. Supp. 1082, 1085 (N.D. Ala. 1997).
77
78
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immediately or very soon. This situation often arises when the officer
says that the interview is for informational purposes only and the police
are not pursuing a criminal suspect,82 that if criminal action is found
there would be no prosecution,83 that the statement would actually
benefit the individual,84 or that the defendant would be released
regardless of what was said.85 Many cases also consider the statement
made by officers that if the defendant were to confess she would be
treated with more sympathy by the trial judge, who would possibly give
her a lesser sentence.86
Judges also may be persuaded by the defense in cases in which
government officials lie about the crime with which the person will be
charged. Normally, this is seen where the officer indicates—sometimes
explicitly, often implicitly—that the crime at issue is not nearly as serious
as it might appear to the suspect. Two cases clearly illustrate this point.
First, in State v. Ritter,87 the defendant made a statement after being
informed by police that the victim of his assault was still alive, actually
recovering, “and suffering from nothing more than a bad headache.”88
Second, just before he confessed, the defendant in Mitchell v. State89 was
told that the victim had died of a heart attack.90 The courts in both cases
condemned the interrogation deceptions and found the resulting

Smith v. State, 787 P.2d 1038, 1039 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990).
See, e.g., Albritton v. State, 769 So. 2d 438, 442 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (“[P]romise
. . . that if [defendant] confessed that she committed the offense as part of a religious ritual,
she would be constitutionally protected and could not be prosecuted.”).
84
Foster v. State, 374 S.E.2d 188, 194 (Ga. 1988) (citations omitted) (“An accused must be
warned that anything he says can and will be used against him in court. Telling him that a
confession is not going to hurt and, on the contrary, will benefit him as much as the police,
is not consistent with the warnings required by Miranda.”).
85
Johnson v. State, 721 So. 2d 650, 659 (Miss. Ct. App. 1998). The converse is seen in
State v. Edwards, 338 S.E.2d 126, 127 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985), where the defendant’s employer
was ready to post bond to insure his timely release; the officers told him that if he did not
make a signed statement he could not get out of jail. See infra text accompanying notes 125–
33.
86
See, e.g., State v. Burgess, 329 S.E.2d 856, 857 (W. Va. 1985).
87
485 S.E.2d 492 (Ga. 1997).
88
Id. at 495.
89
508 So. 2d 1196 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986).
90
Id. at 1199. The court stated:
Officer Turner, who had known the appellant for a long time, testified
at the suppression hearing that he specifically told the appellant “that
the woman died of heart failure and that anything that had been done
to this lady didn’t kill her and she wouldn’t have died unless her heart
quit.”
Id. at 1199 (citations omitted).
82
83
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confessions involuntary, for in each case the defendant had been given
“an implied promise that [he] could not be charged with murder if he
gave a statement to the police.”91
The most difficult cases in this area involve deceptions by the
government about the legal process, but these are lies that are not
necessarily central to the prosecution against the defendant. That is, the
police do not deceive the defendant about going to jail, being charged, or
being convicted of a more serious crime. Instead, these falsehoods
concern the supposedly limited, “confidential” use of confessions,92
which court would have jurisdiction over the defendant,93 or the role of
defense counsel in negotiating a fair result for the defendant.94 However,
even in these cases it should be noted that this principle tends not to be a
per se rule. Rather, these deceptions are viewed as factors in the totality
of circumstances/voluntariness analysis, often resulting in decisions that
the incriminating statements were voluntarily made.95
4.

Judicial Tolerance for Police Lying96

Judges certainly seem ambivalent about the use of deception in the
interrogation process. There is little judicial encouragement of the
practice; indeed, there is a fair amount of comment about the distasteful
nature of lying.97 However, surprisingly few cases in this area involve
determinations that such lying invalidates resulting confessions, either as
a per se matter or as applied in the totality of circumstances test. This is
Mitchell, 508 So. 2d at 1199; State v. Ritter, 485 S.E.2d 492, 495 (Ga. 1997).
See Hopkins v. Cockrell, 325 F.3d 579, 584–85 (5th Cir. 2003); Jones v. State, 65 P.3d
903, 906 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003); State v. McConkie, 755 A.2d 1075, 1078 (Me. 2000).
Deceptions as to the process for the defendant communicating may lead to a different
outcome. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Novo, 812 N.E.2d 1169 (Mass. 2004). In this case,
police told the defendant that if he did not confess at the interrogation session, the jurors in
this trial could not later hear his explanation. The court found that the lie resulted in an
involuntary confession. Id.
93
State v. Quintero, 480 N.W.2d 560 (Iowa 1992).
94
United States v. Anderson, 929 F.2d 96, 100 (2d Cir. 1991).
95
See, e.g., United States v. LeBrun, 363 F.3d 715, 723 (8th Cir. 2004); Johnson v. State, 660
So. 2d 637, 642 (Fla. 1995) (deciding a case where the defendant assumed that statements
during polygraph examination could not be used against him); Pinckney v. State, 576
S.E.2d 574, 577 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (addressing the police statement, “you’re not in any
danger at this point”); State v. Todd, 549 S.E.2d 821, 823 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (considering
the deception that the defendant might be released if he confessed). See generally State v.
Swanigan, 106 P.3d 39 (Kan. 2005).
96
This sub-title is taken from the thoughtful article by Professor Deborah Young,
Unnecessary Evil: Police Lying in Interrogations, 28 CONN. L. REV. 425, 451 (1996).
97
Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 794 N.E.2d 1229, 1232 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003)
(citations omitted) (disapproving of the use of such deception as a tactical device).
91
92
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true even in those cases where courts attempt to distance themselves
from what they believe to be utterly inappropriate government
behavior.98 In short, the deception normally will not be determinative
with the voluntariness test; rather, it will be one factor in the totality of
circumstances to be considered by the courts.99 Sadly, that means there
is little reliable precedent. Virtually every case is very fact specific,
which has led some commentators—but not judges—to call for a bright
line rule that would simply eliminate deceptions during
interrogations.100
B. Threats
With nary a dissent, judges throughout the United States condemn
threats by police officers made during the interrogation process. Indeed,
the language seen in judicial opinions ranges from utter abhorrence101 to
extreme skepticism.102 One can certainly locate a wealth of decisions that
find confessions resulting from threats to be involuntary and thus
inadmissible.103 Even with a very brief look, one sees such decisions
based on a variety of threats: physical harm directed against the
defendant;104 potential prosecution or arrest of friends and family;105
As in DiGiambattista, where the conviction was affirmed with the confession found to
be voluntary, in spite of the language quoted above in a case in which the police misled
“the defendant into believing the Commonwealth had evidence [phony video tape] against
him it did not have.” Id. at 1232; see also State v. Critt, 554 N.W.2d 93, 95–96 (Minn. Ct. App.
1996) (quoting State v. Thaggard, 527 N.W.2d 804, 810 (Minn. 1995)). However, the court
there did repeat the advice that “police that . . . proceed on thin ice and at their own risk
when they use deception of the sort used in this case.” Id. But see State v. Dalzell, a recent
North Carolina murder prosecution where the “[p]olice used a phony arrest warrant and a
fake letter from the district attorney, saying he would seek the death penalty if Dalzell did
not confess to the crime.” Judge Throws Out Confession in Carboro Murder Case, WRAL.com,
Jan. 10, 2005, www.wral.com/print/4066340/detail.html. Calling the actions an “extreme
deviation,” the trial court ordered the resulting confession suppressed. Id.
99
For a good analysis of the test focusing not only on the police lies but on the
individual characteristics of the defendant, see Ex parte Hill, 557 So. 2d 838, 841 (Ala. 1989)
(providing that deception coupled with the defendant’s borderline mental retardation and
schizophrenic personality caused the confession to be viewed as involuntary).
100
See Young, supra note 14, at 477; White, Police Trickery, supra note 14, at 628–29.
101
“A confession is not admissible if it is obtained by any sort of threat or violence,
however slight.” Garcia v. State, 829 S.W.2d 830, 835 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (Kaplan, J.,
dissenting).
102
“[T]hreat-induced confessions must now be considered ‘presumptively involuntary.’”
Beavers v. State, 998 P.2d 1040, 1048 (Alaska 2000) (Bryner, Eastaugh, JJ., dissenting).
103
See infra Part III.B.
104
The United States Supreme Court, of course, has consistently spoken strongly as to
force used, or threatened to be used, in order to elicit an incriminating response. See
Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 287–88 (1991). The rule applies whether the force is to
be used by the police, or by others, such as jail inmates. Griffin v. Strong, 983 F.2d 1540,
98
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greater terms of incarceration;106 lack of protection against others who
threaten the suspect;107 use, or refusal to authorize use, of medical
treatment;108 loss of employment or education;109 and forfeiture of
drivers’ licenses.110
Still, it is an overwhelming reality that even with threats—including
some rather extreme ones—confessions are routinely found to be made
voluntarily, and thus they are admissible. With few exceptions, courts
do not establish any sort of per se inadmissibility rules, and generally the
threat is evaluated in context.111 Thus, it is stated: “[I]t is not enough to
show that threats were made to induce a confession. It must also be
shown in the totality of circumstances that the suspect’s will was
overborne and that the overreaching police conduct was causally related
to the confession.”112

1543 (10th Cir. 1993). The officer in Griffin allegedly told the suspect that if he did not
confess, he would be placed back in the general jail population and “‘they’d come down
and smash [plaintiff’s] guts all over the floor like [defendant] had seen before.’” Id. See
generally Lam v. Kelchner, 304 F.3d 256 (3d Cir. 2002); Zuliani v. State, 903 S.W.2d 812, 823
(Tex. Crim. App. 1995).
105
State v. Baker, 521 S.E.2d 24, 26 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999); People v. Keene, 539 N.Y.S.2d 214
(N.Y. App. Div. 1989); State v. Corns, 426 S.E.2d 324, 327 (S.C. Ct. App. 1992); Black v. State,
820 P.2d 969, 972 (Wyo. 1991). A few courts take a different view, concluding that such
threats are permissible if “the threat could have been lawfully executed. Whether the
police could have lawfully arrested (defendant’s sister) in turn depends on whether the
investigating officers had probable cause to suspect (the sister) of criminal involvement.”
United States v. Johnson, 351 F.3d 254, 262 (6th Cir. 2003); see Turner v. State, 682 N.E.2d
491, 494 (Ind. 1997) (holding that this is true even if the defendant is told that he might face
a capital sentence); State v. Chapman, 605 A.2d 1055, 1061 (N.H. 1992) (holding that this is
also true even if the defendant is told he “could go to jail for a long time”). See generally
United States v. Santos-Garcia, 313 F.3d 1073, 1078–79 (8th Cir. 2002); United States v.
Thomas, 595 A.2d 980, 981 (D.C. 1991); State v. Massey, 535 So. 2d 1135, 1141 (La. Ct. App.
1988); State v. Hunn, 821 S.W.2d 866, 870 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
106
This can be found with extended incarceration time, revocation of bond or probation
status, imposition of a high bond requirement, or delayed release from custody. United
States v. Mashburn, 406 F.3d 303, 305 (4th Cir. 2005); State v. Strayhand, 911 P.2d 577, 585
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1995); People v. Thomas, 839 P.2d 1174, 1178 (Colo. 1992); People v.
McIntyre, 789 P.2d 1108, 1110 (Colo. 1990); State v. Tuttle, 650 N.W.2d 20, 28–29 (S.D. 2002).
107
State v. Pilcher, 472 N.W.2d 327, 334 (Minn. 1991); State v. Foster, 729 P.2d 599, 604
(Or. Ct. App. 1986).
108
State v. Wright, 587 N.E.2d 906, 910 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990); State v. Phelps, 456 N.W.2d
290, 294 (Neb. 1990).
109
State v. Chavarria, 33 P.3d 922, 927 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001); State v. Bowe, 881 P.2d 538,
547 (Haw. 1994).
110
Webb v. State, 756 P.2d 293, 296 (Alaska 1988).
111
See State v. Tuttle, 650 N.W.2d 20, 35 (S.D. 2002).
112
Id. As stated in United States v. Braxton:
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This showing is difficult to make.113 Confessions have been found to
be voluntary even with stark threats such as the following: a refusal to
offer protection though a credible danger of violence existed,114 a
statement that the police will arrest the defendant’s wife,115 a threat to
incarcerate the suspect for an extended period of time,116 a threat to
possibly cause harm to the defendant,117 or a comment about removing a
child from the defendant’s family.118
C. Promises
As noted earlier,119 most judges in the United States have rejected the
early pronouncement of the United States Supreme Court on the impact
of promises during interrogation.120 The Court in the Bram case wrote
that a confession could not be allowed if it resulted from “any direct or
implied promises, however slight. . . .”121 Once the Supreme Court itself
retreated from this broad view,122 courts throughout the country looked
at promises made, but not necessarily as disqualifying factors. Rather,
they were to be taken as matters to be evaluated in the totality of
circumstances.123 Most judges decided that “[p]romises of leniency, in
The mere existence of threats, violence, implied promises, improper
influence, or other coercive police activity, however, does not
automatically render a confession involuntary. . . . To determine
whether a defendant’s will has been overborne or his capacity for selfdetermination critically impaired, courts must consider “the ‘totality of
the circumstances,’ including the characteristics of the defendant, the
setting of the interview, and the details of the interrogation.”
112 F.3d 777, 780–81 (4th Cir. 1997); see also State v. Swanigan, 106 P.3d 39, 44 (Kan. 2005).
113
However, this is not impossible, as in Tuttle, where the other circumstances allowed
for a finding of coercion. There the defendant was in a cell, interrogated in the middle of
the night, under the influence of alcohol, only eighteen years old, deceived about the
evidence against him, and threatened with harsh (though not explicitly described)
treatment by the government. Tuttle, 650 N.W.2d at 35.
114
State v. Sanders, 13 P.3d 460, 466 (N.M. 2000).
115
State v. Schumacher, 37 P.3d 6, 13 (Idaho Ct. App. 2001).
116
Braxton, 112 F.3d at 785–86.
117
State v. Bays, 716 N.E.2d 1126, 1137 (Ohio 1999). The decision in Bays is rather
striking, for the officers there also misled the defendant as to the strength of the evidence
against him, and the defendant showed that he had a very low I.Q. Id. at 1137.
118
Compare State v. P.Z., 703 A.2d 901, 915–16 (N.J. 1997) (emphasizing that a statement
was made not during a usual criminal justice interrogation, as in Lynumn, but during a
child abuse investigation), with People v. Medina, 25 P.3d 1216 (Colo. 2001).
119
See supra text accompanying notes 19–25.
120
For a good discussion of the basic point, see United States v. Jacobs, 431 F.3d 99, 109–11
(3d Cir. 2005).
121
168 U.S. 532, 542–43 (1897).
122
Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 286 (1991).
123
See generally United States v. Brave Heart, 397 F.3d 1035, 1041 (8th Cir. 2005) (“‘[A]
promise . . . “does not render a confession involuntary per se.”’ It is simply one factor to be
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and of themselves, do not necessarily render a confession
involuntary.”124 While there are some dissenters from this view, there
are not many.125
To have a confession declared involuntary purely because of a
government promise is an uncommon occurrence. Apart from the merits
of the claim, courts will not consider applying the standard test unless
the defendant can demonstrate a causal link between the promise and
the confession. That is, she must show that she acted in reliance on the
promise126 and that she was “induced” to confess as a result of the
promise.127 Except in the most extraordinary of cases,128 if the promise
was kept, most courts appear to find the analysis at an end.129 Thus,

considered in the totality of circumstances.”); Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 685 (4th Cir. 2001)
(“[T]he existence of a promise in connection with a confession does not render a confession
per se involuntary.”); United States v. Walton, 10 F.3d 1024, 1028 (3d Cir. 1993) (“[I]t is clear
that the voluntariness of a confession does not depend solely upon whether it was made in
response to promises.”); Bays, 716 N.E.2d at 1137 (“A promise of leniency, while relevant to
the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis, does not require that the confession be
automatically suppressed.”).
124
State v. Luke, 1 P.3d 795, 799 (Idaho 2000); see also State v. Durost, 497 A.2d 134, 137
(Me. 1985). This is the position taken by one prominent observer as well. Welsh S. White,
Miranda’s Illusion: Telling Stories in the Police Interrogation Room, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1091, 1119
(2003).
125
See Ex parte Williams, 780 So. 2d 673, 676 (Ala. 2000) (“[A]ny hope engendered or
encouraged that the prisoner’s case will be lightened . . . if he will confess . . . is enough to
exclude the confession.”); State v. Jennett, 574 N.W.2d 361, 368 (Iowa App. 1997) (Sackett, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“For a statement to be considered free and
voluntary, it must not be obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight.”);
Harper v. State, 722 So. 2d 1267, 1273 (Miss. Ct. App. 1998) (“[L]aw enforcement officers
should refrain from giving such an impression, [of favor if defendant confesses], ‘however
slight.’”). Also, refer to the Official Code of Georgia: “To make a confession admissible, it
must have been made voluntarily, without being induced by another by the slightest hope
of benefit or remotest fear of injury. . . . [But] [t]he fact that a confession has been made
under a spiritual exhortation, a promise of secrecy, or a promise of collateral benefit shall
not exclude it.” GA. CODE ANN. §§ 24-3-50, -51 (2005).
126
State v. Trostle, 951 P.2d 869, 879 (Ariz. 1997).
127
Mason v. State, 116 S.W.3d 248, 260 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
128
Of course, if a promise is made to the accused and not kept by the government, any
resulting confession is more likely to be struck down. See Pyles v. State, 947 S.W.2d 754,
755–56 (Ark. 1997); Satter v. Solem, 458 N.W.2d 762, 769 (S.D. 1990).
129
See Conner v. State, 982 S.W.2d 655, 663 (Ark. 1998) (“[A] statement should be
suppressed only if the promise of leniency or reward was false. Here, the State honored
the detective’s promise to ‘save Conner’s life’ by waiving the death penalty. There was no
detrimental reliance.”); see also State v. Thomas, 673 N.W.2d 897, 906–07 (Neb. 2004);
Harrison v. Commonwealth, 349 S.E.2d 167, 170 (Va. Ct. App. 1986). As stated in United
States v. Rutledge: “Government is not forbidden to ‘buy’ information with honest promises
of consideration.” 900 F.2d 1127, 1130 (7th Cir. 1990). But see State v. Leonard, 605 So. 2d
697, 700 (La. Ct. App. 1992).
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there are many cases in which confessions are found to be voluntary
based upon a variety of promises made, including vague guarantees that
the defendant will receive better treatment if she confesses,130 offers of
more lenient punishment for the suspect,131 assurances of lesser charges
being prosecuted if the individual confesses,132 and the receipt of medical
treatment if she makes an incriminating statement.133
The reader ought not to be misled here. There is little clarity in this
area. To be sure, a number of cases are readily identifiable in which
confessions based upon promises have been held to be involuntary.
Such cases have led to considerable confusion as to the law and the
application of constitutional principles, especially when they often come
from the very same courts, which—in other prosecutions, as noted
above—allowed the same or very similar promises to induce confessions.
These cases included agreements not to charge or to bring lesser counts if
a statement was made,134 promises of leniency for friends or family
[T]here is no authority for the proposition that an induced statement is
made voluntary and admissible by the fulfillment of the inducement.
The proper inquiry is not whether the inducement has or has not been
fulfilled, rather it is whether the statements made by the interrogating
officer constitute such an inducement that the statements made are not
voluntary.
Id.
130
The court in Rutledge stated the principle forcefully: “The police are allowed to play
on a suspect’s ignorance, his anxieties, his fears, and his uncertainties; they just are not
allowed to magnify those fears, uncertainties, and so forth to the point where rational
decision becomes impossible.” Rutledge, 900 F.2d at 1130. See generally United States v.
Santiago, 410 F.3d 193, 202–03 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Stewart, 388 F.3d 1079, 1086
(7th Cir. 2004); McLeod v. State, 718 So. 2d 727, 729–30 (Ala. 1998); State v. Blakeley, 65 P.3d
77, 84 (Ariz. 2003); Evans v. State, 545 S.E.2d 641, 643 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001); State v. Bone, 550
S.E.2d 482, 490 (N.C. 2001); State v. Beland, 645 A.2d 79, 81 (N.H. 1994); State v. Johnson,
765 S.W.2d 780, 782 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989).
131
See United States v. Otters, 197 F.3d 316, 318 (8th Cir. 1999); Sprosty v. Buchler, 79 F.3d
635, 645–46 (7th Cir. 1996); Knight v. State, 971 S.W.2d 272, 274 (Ark. Ct. App. 1998); People
v. Wickham, 53 P.3d 691 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001); State v. Wilson, 894 P.2d 159, 161 (Idaho Ct.
App. 1995). But see State v. Ray, 531 S.E.2d 705, 707 (Ga. 2000) (applying state statutory
requirements, as discussed above).
132
See, e.g., Thompson v. State, 768 P.2d 127, 131 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989).
133
State v. McColl, 813 A.2d 107, 122 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003) (relating to drug treatment);
Commonwealth v. Felice, 693 N.E.2d 713, 715 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998) (addressing psychiatric
help); People v. Pugh, 607 N.Y.S.2d 761–62 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (pertaining to
psychological assistance); State v. Slowinski, 450 N.W.2d 107, 112 (Minn. 1990) (discussing
psychiatric care); People v. Taber, 495 N.Y.S.2d 529 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (analyzing
medical help).
134
Williams v. Withrow, 944 F.2d 284, 289 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Rogers, 906
F.2d 189, 191 (5th Cir. 1990); Prince v. State, 584 So. 2d 889, 892 (Ala. Crim. Ct. App. 1991);
Miller v. State, 18 P.3d 696, 700 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001); State v. Tamerius, 449 N.W.2d 535,
537 (Neb. 1989); People v. Hilliard, 499 N.Y.S.2d 283 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986); State v. Pickar,
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members once a confession was given,135 assurances of protection from
threats of others as soon as the suspect spoke,136 guarantees of treatment
if the defendant cooperated,137 exchange of lighter sentences for formal
declarations by the individual,138 and representations by the government
that if a statement was made it would somehow remain confidential.139
D. Duration of Interrogation
The timing of the confession, both as to when it occurs140 and how
long the process takes, is a perfect example of how little certainty exists
within the due process analysis. The extreme situations, of course, are
not difficult to identify and categorize. The leading decision comes from
the United States Supreme Court and is now over sixty years old. In
Ashcraft v. Tennessee,141 the defendant was held for thirty-six hours and
cut off from all contact with others. Teams of investigators drilled the
defendant with questions. During this period, the defendant went with
virtually no break, which included no sleep or rest. The Justices had no
trouble deciding that the resulting confession was coerced and could not
be used as evidence against him. The language of Justice Black is
striking:
453 N.W.2d 783, 787 (N.D. 1990); Robinson v. State, 855 S.W.2d 107, 108–09 (Tex. App.
1993).
135
State v. Harper, 485 So. 2d 224, 227 (La. Ct. App. 1986); Lowry v. State, 729 P.2d 511,
513 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986); Tovar v. State, 709 S.W.2d 25, 28 (Tex. App. 1986).
136
Winder v. State, 765 A.2d 97, 121 (Md. 2001).
137
State v. Phillips, 30 S.W.3d 372, 375–76 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000).
138
State v. Hankerson, 604 So. 2d 1330, 1334 (La. Ct. App. 1992); Commonwealth v.
Distefano, 782 A.2d 574, 581 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001).
139
United States v. Walton, 10 F.3d 1024, 1027 (3d Cir. 1993); State v. Sheehan, 515 So. 2d
670, 674 (La. Ct. App. 1987); State v. McDermott, 554 A.2d 1302, 1305 (N.H. 1989); State v.
Pillar, 820 A.2d 1, 15 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003); State v. Allen, 432 S.E.2d 199, 202 (W.
Va. 1993).
140
This refers to the timing problem in which the authorities delay in taking the suspect
to appear before a judicial officer, not necessarily the extended period for the interrogation.
With the former, very specific rules govern the procedure so that the due process analysis
does not often surface. In the federal courts, the Supreme Court’s holdings in McNabb v.
United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), and Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957), prompted
Congress to adopt a statutory provision that gives officers a “six-hour ‘safe harbor’” to
question the suspect before being required to bring him to a judicial officer. United States
v. Mansoori, 304 F.3d 635, 660 (7th Cir. 2002); see 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c) (2000). A delay of
longer than the six-hour period allows—but does not require—a resulting confession to be
deemed inadmissible. Many states have similar requirements. See, e.g., Williams v. State,
825 A.2d 1078, 1095 (Md. 2003) (“We hold that any deliberate and unnecessary delay in
presenting an accused before a District Court Commissioner, in violation of [the rules]
must be given very heavy weight in determining whether a resulting confession is
voluntary.”).
141
Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944).
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Testimony of the officers shows that the reason they
questioned Ashcraft “in relays” was that they became so
tired they were compelled to rest. But from 7:00
Saturday evening until 9:30 Monday morning Ashcraft
had no rest. One officer did say that he gave the suspect
a single five minutes respite, but except for this five
minutes the procedure consisted of one continuous
stream of questions. . . . We think a situation such as
that here shown by uncontradicted evidence is so
inherently coercive that its very existence is
irreconcilable with the possession of mental freedom by
a lone suspect against whom its full coercive force is
brought to bear. It is inconceivable that any court of
justice in the land, conducted as our courts are, open to
the public, would permit prosecutors serving in relays to
keep a defendant witness under continuous cross
examination for thirty-six hours without rest or sleep in
an effort to extract a “voluntary” confession. Nor can
we, consistently with Constitutional due process of law,
hold voluntary a confession where prosecutors do the
same thing away from the restraining influences of a
public trial in an open court room. The Constitution of
the United States stands as a bar against the conviction
of any individual in an American court by means of a
coerced confession. There have been, and are now,
certain foreign nations with governments dedicated to
an opposite policy:
governments which convict
individuals with testimony obtained by police
organizations possessed of an unrestrained power to
seize persons suspected of crimes against the state, hold
them in secret custody, and wring from them
confessions by physical or mental torture. So long as the
Constitution remains the basic law of our Republic,
America will not have that kind of government.142
While powerful in its language and holding, Ashcraft has carried
relatively limited precedential value.
There is rarely nonstop
questioning conducted by teams of investigators over more than one full
day in which a suspect is not given any time for rest. Once the
prosecution at issue moves away from such an extreme situation, it
becomes problematic for courts to determine the reach of the
142

Id. at 149–55.
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voluntariness test in terms of the duration of the questioning process.143
Some courts conclude that a lengthy interrogation period, by itself, may
be enough to cause the resulting confession to be invalid.144 Other
judges feel that time itself is not necessarily the determinative factor.145
Instead, they look to other considerations to decide whether the
confession is voluntary. Such considerations include the atmosphere
surrounding the interrogation,146 the number and duration of breaks
during the process,147 and the purpose for the questioning.148
At the conclusion of a review of these cases, it is striking how little
guidance lawyers, judges, and law enforcement officers have in terms of
the allowable time for police questioning. The experience in one state
over a one-year period illustrates the point. Within a period of thirteen
months, three New York courts scrutinized extended interrogations and
reached quite different results. In one case, the suspect was questioned
143
In a case in which the defendant complained about an interrogation period of a little
more than two hours, the court in People v. DeLisle discussed the necessary considerations:
In determining whether a statement is voluntary, the circumstances
which must be considered include, but are not limited to, the length
and conditions of the detention, the physical and mental state of the
defendant, the age, mentality, and prior criminal experience of the
defendant, the nature of any inducement offered, the conduct of the
police, and the adequacy and frequency of the advice of rights.
455 N.W.2d 401, 403–04 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990). The confession was determined to be
coerced, with the court focusing on the length of the interrogation, the defendant’s
emotional state, his lack of experience with the criminal justice system, and his limited
education.
144
See, e.g., Pardue v. State, 695 So. 2d 199, 205 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996) (addressing a
series of interrogations that took place over a seventy-hour period); Smith v. Duckworth,
910 F.2d 1492, 1496 (7th Cir. 1990) (considering a situation where the total time of
questioning was nine hours); State v. Johnston, 580 N.E.2d 1162, 1167 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990)
(analyzing an interrogation that lasted eight and one-half hours).
145
William v. Nye, 869 F. Supp. 867, 871 (D. Kan. 1994), aff’d, 83 F.3d 434 (10th Cir. 1996)
(questioning of nineteen hours); State v. Munoz, 972 P.2d 847, 853 (N.M. 1998) (questioning
less than two hours); Smith v. State, 779 S.W.2d 417, 428 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989)
(interrogating for eight hours).
146
See, e.g., Gonzales v. State, 807 S.W.2d 830, 833 (Tex. App. 1991) (“Although
appellant’s interview here lasted four and one-half hours, officers testified he was free to
leave at anytime, had he asked for something they would have tried to oblige him, and he
was not threatened in any way.”). See generally State v. Harris, 105 P.3d 1258 (Kan. 2005).
147
See, e.g., People v. Hill, 839 P.2d 984, 994 (Cal. 1992) (“The 12-hour period . . . was not
one of continuous interrogation. The actual interrogation, which was divided into five
sessions, comprised only about eight hours. The breaks between sessions were not of
insignificant duration.”). See generally Conde v. State, 860 So. 2d 930 (Fla. 2003); State v.
Blackman, 875 S.W.2d 122, 135–36 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).
148
Williams v. State, 991 S.W.2d 565, 574 (Ark. 1999) (allowing a thirteen hour
interrogation process, for the “focus of the officers was on finding [the victim], who at the
time of the interview was still missing and presumed alive”).
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for ten hours. The court allowed the process, remarking that there “was
no evidence that the police officers threatened or pressured the
defendant. . . . At all times, he indicated his willingness to talk.”149 A
similar ruling was issued in a case in which the defendant was
interviewed for nine hours and the court stated that the defendant had
been given the Miranda warnings, “was not subjected to continuous
interrogation, and he was not denied sleep or food when requested.”150
If those two cases reflect the New York law on point, it is difficult to
explain the third case, where the resulting confession was found to be
coerced.151 The interrogation in the third case took place during a
twenty-three hour incarceration, but there was no indication of how long
the actual questioning took. For the court, it was “noteworthy that the
defendant was not offered anything of substance to eat until eighteen
hours after his arrest.”152 All three courts offered the somewhat less than
helpful observation that the decision as to whether a confession has been
coerced “is to be determined from the perspective of the defendant.”153
E. The Individual Defendant
As noted in the previous section, courts look closely at the
characteristics of the particular defendant to determine whether that
person was truly coerced by the actions of the police. The courts
evaluate a wide range of traits in order to fairly “focuses on the
particular individual rather than on a hypothetical reasonable person.”154
A number of the more significant factors are described below.
1.

Age

There is no prohibition against the interrogation of minors. The
confessions of even young teens have been routinely allowed.155
People v. Smith, 617 N.Y.S.2d 884, 885 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
People v. Hayes, 633 N.Y.S.2d 565, 566 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995).
151
People v. Johnson, 636 N.Y.S.2d 540, 546 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995).
152
Id.
153
Id. at 545.
154
United States v. Lewis, 921 F.2d 1294, 1301 (D.C. Cir. 1990); see also State v. Pickar, 453
N.W.2d 783, 787 (N.D. 1990) (“The proper inquiry is whether, given the characteristics and
condition of the accused, the atmosphere surrounding the interrogation was coercive.”).
155
See, e.g., Martinez v. State, 131 S.W.3d 22, 24 (Tex. App. 2003) (“Evidence of Martinez’s
world experiences shows that he was more sophisticated than an average 15 year-old.”); In
re V.M.D., 974 S.W.2d 332, 346 (Tex. App. 1998) (holding that the confession of twelve-yearold in a capital case was voluntary); Misskelley v. State, 915 S.W.2d 702, 712 (Ark. 1996)
(considering a fact pattern where the defendant was “just thirty-seven days away from his
eighteenth birthday”); Everetts v. United States, 627 A.2d 981 (D.C. App. 1993) (holding
that a sixteen-year-old teen was allowed to give statement).
149
150
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Nevertheless, it is clear that such confessions will be scrutinized carefully
to determine the ability of the youth to make a voluntary statement. The
leading case is Haley v. Ohio,156 where the United States Supreme Court
appeared shocked at seeing a teenager questioned by teams of police
officers for more than five hours. The Court wrote:
What transpired would make us pause for careful
inquiry if a mature man were involved. And when, as
here, a mere child-an easy victim of the law-is before us,
special care in scrutinizing the record must be used. Age
15 is a tender and difficult age for a boy of any race. He
cannot be judged by the more exacting standards of
maturity. That which would leave a man cold and
unimpressed can overawe and overwhelm a lad in his
early teens. This is the period of great instability which
the crisis of adolescence produces. A 15-year old lad,
questioned through the dead of night by relays of police,
is a ready victim of the inquisition. Mature men possibly
might stand the ordeal from midnight to 5 a.m. But we
cannot believe that a lad of tender years is a match for
the police in such a contest. He needs counsel and
support if he is not to become the victim first of fear,
then of panic. He needs someone on whom to lean lest
the overpowering presence of the law, as he knows it,
may not crush him.157

332 U.S. 596 (1948).
Id. at 599–600; see also Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962). In Gallegos, the Court
reasoned:
The fact that petitioner was only 14 years old puts this case on the
same footing as Haley v. Ohio, supra. There was here no evidence of
prolonged questioning. But the five-day detention—during which time
the boy’s mother unsuccessfully tried to see him and he was cut off
from contact with any lawyer or adult advisor—gives the case an
ominous cast. The prosecution says that the boy was advised of his
right to counsel, but that he did not ask either for a lawyer or for his
parents. But a 14-year-old boy, no matter how sophisticated, is
unlikely to have any conception of what will confront him when he is
made accessible only to the police. That is to say, we deal with a
person who is not equal to the police in knowledge and understanding
of the consequences of the questions and answers being recorded and
who is unable to know how to protect his own interests or how to get
the benefits of his constitutional rights.
The prosecution says that the youth and immaturity of the petitioner
and the five-day detention are irrelevant, because the basic ingredients
of the confession came tumbling out as soon as he was arrested. But if
156
157
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Fortunately, few modern cases approach reaching the egregious
practices in Haley. Still, many judges express special concern when the
accused is a minor.158 In a federal case decided just last year, a sixteenyear-old was interrogated for three hours in the middle of the night
without an adult advising him.159 Although he had been arrested before,
the court concentrated heavily on the defendant’s “relative youth” in
finding his confession to be involuntarily given.160 Similarly, another
opinion emphasized the youth of the defendant—eleven years old—in
determining that the confession had not been freely given:
Every factor weighed in our analysis militates against
the conclusion that LaCresha’s statement was voluntary.
At eleven years of age, . . . [s]he had no experience with
the criminal justice system, had been held in the custody
of the State for three days, was unaccompanied by any
parent, guardian, attorney, or other friendly adult, and
was found to have below-normal intelligence by the
court-appointed psychiatrist prior to her criminal trial,
. . . .161
2.

The Defendant’s Health

A defendant’s health is not often viewed as a factor that indicates
that the confession was voluntary. It is rare to see the reasoning that the
confession was voluntary because the “defendant was in robust health,”
or “the accused was viewed as cured of his mental illness.”162 Instead,
we took that position, it would, with all deference, be in callous
disregard of this boy’s constitutional rights. He cannot be compared
with an adult in full possession of his senses and knowledgeable of the
consequences of his admissions.
370 U.S. at 53–54.
158
As they should, based on the empirical evidence that has been assembled. See infra
note 184.
159
Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2004).
160
Id. at 1015.
161
Murray v. Earle, 405 F.3d 278, 288 (5th Cir. 2005); see also State v. Ellvanger, 453
N.W.2d 810 (N.D. 1990). In Ellvanger, the court stated:
An intoxicated fifteen-year-old boy who may or may not have been
given his Miranda warnings was repeatedly interrogated by officers in
early morning hours; he had had little sleep in the preceding 24 hours;
he was experiencing the shock of the death of a friend and the
wounding of his father; he was not represented by a parent, guardian,
or custodian; he was denied his right to counsel . . . .
453 N.W.2d at 815.
162
But see State v. Troyer, 910 P.2d 1182, 1188 (Utah 1995) (emphasizing that the
defendant “was both physically and mentally fit”).
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the matter arises—with some regularity—when serious questions are
raised as to concerns about the defendant’s physical or mental health in
connection with the interrogation process. The questions normally occur
in three factual settings.
The first setting is the situation in which the defendant is physically
ailing and is either hospitalized or bedridden. In such cases, the courts
may allow the confession, but the conditions will be rigorously
scrutinized.163 The second setting involves evidence that the defendant
made an incriminating statement at a time when she was under the
influence of alcohol or drugs. Judges appear to have little tolerance in
this setting and regularly allow confessions even when the suspect was
substantially under the influence.164 It will likely take an unusual
situation before judges are willing to find a confession in such a case to
be involuntary.165
The third setting is the most problematic because it involves
defendants who suffer from serious mental illness.
Here, mere
allegations of such illness will not suffice. Instead, courts demand that
the defendant show that he suffers from such a disorder and
demonstrate that the disease affected the defendant’s ability to
understand the rights explained to him and to voluntarily give a
statement. As explained recently by the Court of Criminal Appeals of
Texas, evidence of a mental disorder is relevant in the voluntariness
analysis. The relevance of the disorder depends on the fulfillment of two
criteria:

163
In State v. Vincik, 398 N.W.2d 788, 792 (Iowa 1987), the confession was invalidated
with the court looking carefully at the defendant’s condition. “We cannot divorce Vincik’s
infirm mental and physical condition from the police officers’ actions here. Vincik did not
walk up to these two officers and offer to talk about a crime; he was arrested at the hospital
and hauled to the . . . police station for interrogation.” Id.
164
See State v. Rivera, 733 P.2d 1090, 1096 (Ariz. 1987) (“The fact that defendant may still
have been intoxicated at the time of his confession does not necessarily make the statement
involuntary and thus inadmissible.”); State v. Barczak, 562 A.2d 140, 145 (Me. 1989) (“[The
issue is whether] despite the degree of intoxication he is aware and capable of
comprehending and communicating with coherence and rationality.” (quoting State v.
Finson, 447 A.2d 788, 792 (N.J. 1982))); Coon v. Weber, 644 N.W.2d 638, 645 (S.D. 2002)
(“[T]he test for undue influence is whether the defendant can still relate the events of the
time in question and his role in them.”). But see Allan v. State, 38 P.3d 175, 178 (Nev. 2002)
(rejecting the confession of the defendant—under the influence of methamphetamine—
who was subject to police questioning using “forms of psychological pressure”). Contra
Floyd v. State, 42 P.3d 249, 260 (Nev. 2002) (accepting the argument that the defendant was
not in any sort of physical discomfort, and was only “somewhat intoxicated”).
165
See generally State v. Young, 469 So. 2d 1014 (La. App. 1985).
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The first concerns the existence of proof . . . illustrating
that the mental condition . . . was reasonably capable of
having such an affect on appellant’s mind so as to
render the confession involuntary. . . . The second
concerns the existence of proof illustrating that the
condition impaired the accused at the time he
confessed.166
The actual number of reported decisions in which a confession is
found to be involuntary because of the suspect’s mental illness is
small.167 Such decisions are made, but they are relatively rare.168
3.

Intelligence Quotient (“I.Q.”)

The impact of low I.Q. scores on the voluntariness test is especially
troubling.169 It is disturbing because such scores may signal an inability
of the suspect to understand the proceedings or lead to an individual
being easily swayed into responding to what might otherwise appear to
be non-coercive law enforcement practices. Yet, the courts are clear that
a low score alone is not sufficient to find a confession to be involuntary:
[D]iminished mental or intellectual capacity does not of
itself vitiate the ability to make a knowing and

166
Darnes v. State, 118 S.W.3d 916, 921 (Tex. App. 2003). For an interesting discussion of
the need for expert testimony when a defendant argues that someone with a particular
“psychological profile sometimes makes statements that appear to be voluntary but that
are in fact the product of suggestion,” see State v. Romero, 81 P.3d 714, 723 (Or. Ct. App.
2003). See generally Claudio Salas, Note, The Case for Excluding the Criminal Confessions of the
Mentally Ill, 16 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 243 (2004).
167
See Young, 469 So. 2d at 1014; Darnes, 118 S.W.3d 916. See generally State v. Blank, 804
So. 2d 132, 140 (La. App. 2001) (addressing diminished mental capacity); State v. Halcomb,
510 N.W.2d 344, 350 (Neb. App. 1993) (considering multiple personality disorder).
168
Wilson v. Lawrence Country, 260 F.3d 946, 952 (8th Cir. 2001), provides a good
illustration of the unusual prosecution. There the criminal defendant appeared to have
serious mental problems, and some authorities thought “he had difficulty distinguishing
between fantasy and reality.” Id. at 952. The police intensely interrogated him and he
made incriminating comments. Id. The Government argued that the confession was
voluntary because the deceptive techniques utilized were no different from what had been
affirmed in earlier cases (lies about evidence against him, threats as to imminent arrest,
etc.). Id. at 953. The court categorically rejected this position, for here the “confessor
. . . was mentally handicapped.” Id. Moreover, the fact that the defendant was advised of
his rights did not move the court for he was “unlikely to understand them because of his
low intelligence.” Id. at 953.
169
Michael J. O’Connell, Miranda Comprehension in Adults with Mental Retardation and the
Effects of Feedback Style on Suggestibility, 29 L. & HUM. BEHAVIOR 359, 359–69 (2005).
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intelligent waiver of constitutional rights and a free and
voluntary confession.170
[A] subnormal mental capacity . . . does not, however,
standing alone, render an in-custody statement
incompetent if it is in all other respects voluntary and
understandingly made.171
[M]ental deficiencies of a defendant, by themselves, are
not sufficient to render a confession involuntary. To
establish that his confession was involuntary, petitioner
must also establish police coercion.172
One factor that is often used to “balance out” the low intellectual
ability of the accused is her experience with the criminal justice system.
Such experience is thought to establish “some degree of familiarity with
the criminal justice system.”173 Also, it may indicate that the individual
is “better able to communicate in this field than most others,”174 and
“would have aided him in understanding Miranda warnings.”175 Thus, it
is not at all surprising that many courts have admitted confessions even
in cases in which defendants possessed extremely low intelligence as
indicated by sub-normal I.Q. scores. The key for these courts is a
conclusion that the experienced defendant—in spite of low intelligence—
is able to understand the proceedings, rationally consider the rights
discussed, and freely choose to speak.176 This conclusion is especially
significant if coupled with police tactics that are less than extreme.177

170
State v. Lavalais, 685 So. 2d 1048, 1054 (La. 1996) (allowing a statement where the
defendant’s I.Q. score was seventy-seven).
171
State v. Mahatha, 578 S.E.2d 617, 624 (N.C. App. 2003) (quoting State v. Fincher, 305
S.E.2d 685, 690 (N.C. 1983) (finding a confession voluntary despite an I.Q. score of sixtytwo)).
172
Moore v. Dugger, 856 F.2d 129, 131–32 (11th Cir. 1988) (allowing incriminating
comments where the defendant’s I.Q. score was sixty-two). The judges relied heavily on
Colorado v. Connelly in finding that no improper police action took place. See supra text
accompanying notes 38–49. See generally Rogers v. Commonwealth, 86 S.W.3d 29, 36 (Ky.
2002).
173
Rankin v. State, 1 S.W.3d 14, 18 (Ark. 1999).
174
People v. Travis, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 1144 (Ill. App. 1988).
175
Commonwealth v. St. Peter, 722 N.E.2d 1002, 1007 (Mass. App. 2000).
176
See, e.g., State v. Cook, 67 S.W.3d 718 (Mo. App. 2002); Briones v. State, No. 13-01-152CR, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 7305 (Tex. App. Aug. 27, 2003); Franks v. State, 90 S.W.3d 771
(Tex. App. 2002). See generally Roberts v. State, 102 S.W.3d 482 (Ark. 2003); State v.
Camacho, 561 N.W.2d 160 (Minn. 1997).
177
See, e.g., People v. Melock, 599 N.E.2d 941, 953 (Ill. 1992); State v. Lynch, 787 N.E.2d
1185, 1199 (Ohio 2003).
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Again, unfortunately there exists a glaring lack of consistency in this
area. Many courts oppose admitting statements of individuals with subnormal intelligence. Three cases from across the country illustrate this
point. A defendant’s murder conviction was reversed in State v.
Rettenberger.178 The Utah Supreme Court found that because of the
defendant’s “below-average I.Q. . . . he ‘was more susceptible to stress
and coercion than the average person.’”179 The West Virginia Supreme
Court, in State v. Lopez,180 set aside a conviction for felony-murder when
the evidence showed that the accused had difficulty with the English
language and “had the mental capacity of a five-year old, that he had
borderline mental functioning, and that he thought only in concrete
terms . . . [and] was unable to understand abstract concepts such as the
right to silence.”181 The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reached a similar
result in State v. Cumber.182 The Wisconsin court laid out the evidence
dealing with defendant’s capabilities:
The officer acknowledged that Cumber had difficulty
keeping his mind on a particular subject for any length
of time. He testified that Cumber was confused and
upset, crying and contradicting himself several times
during the interrogation and asking for help. . . .
Cumber’s own testimony . . . revealed pronounced
difficulty in reading. His several attempts to read from
his statement while on the stand uniformly lapsed into
extreme confusion and nonsensical sentences.183
It is not surprising that the courts are not in full agreement about the
application of the voluntariness test to this fact pattern involving subnormal intelligence. However, what is extremely problematic is that
there is considerable relevant empirical evidence that should impact the
decision making process, but such evidence is essentially ignored by
many judges on both sides of the debate.184

984 P.2d 1009 (Utah 1999).
Id. at 1019.
180
476 S.E.2d 227 (W. Va. 1996).
181
Id. at 235.
182
387 N.W.2d 291 (Wis. App. 1986).
183
Id. at 294.
184
As noted in one recent article: “Studies and surveys have found that both minors and
the mentally impaired are more likely to make false confessions, in part because they are
more vulnerable to suggestion.” Maura Dolan & Evelyn Larrubia, Telling Police What They
Want to Hear, Even if It’s False, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2004, at 1, available at http://www.
latimes.com/news/local/la-me-confess30oct30,0,7515039,print.story?coll=la-.
178
179
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I do not argue that judges are incapable of carefully reviewing such
information; after all, that is precisely what the United States Supreme
Court did in determining that mentally retarded defendants cannot be
sentenced to death.185 The Supreme Court’s analysis was thoughtful and
respectful of the relevant scientific research in the field.186 Rather, one is
struck by how little weight is placed on the empirical evidence that
discusses the ability of persons with sub-average intelligence to
understand the proceedings187 or resist heavy police activity and freely
choose to make a statement.188 While several commentators have
attempted to come to grips with such work,189 judges do not often make
the effort. Instead, even in cases of defendants with very low I.Q. scores,
judicial opinions spend little time on such scores and make mere
references to the fact that the defendant was advised of his rights190 or
that the person had the ability to understand the rights and to confess
voluntarily.191

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
See also Smith v. Texas, 543 U.S. 37 (2004); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 535 (2003)
(looking to low I.Q. scores as being the basis for jurors to decline to sentence a convicted
capital defendant to the death penalty); In re Hawthorne, 105 P.3d 352 (Cal. 2005)
(California Supreme Court refused to identify any I.Q. score as indicating mental
retardation in the capital sentencing context).
187
Researchers in England:
[F]ound that many people with learning disabilities did not
understand that they had a right to legal advice and/or a right to have
someone informed of the whereabouts, even when the Notice [of
rights, similar to Miranda warnings] was read out to them . . . [and
even after the Notice was simplified] 68% of the sentences were fully
understood by people in the normal range for ability, while people
with intellectual disabilities understood only 11% of sentences.
G. Murphy & I.C. Clare, People with Learning Disabilities as Offenders or Alleged Offenders in
the UK Criminal Justice System, 91 J. ROYAL SOC. MED. 178, 180 (1998). The U.S. studies are
similar. See Solomon M. Fulero & Caroline Everington, Assessing the Capacity of Persons with
Mental Retardation to Waive Miranda Rights: A Jurisprudent Therapy Perspective, 28 L. &
PSYCHOL. REV. 53 (2004).
188
“People of limited intelligence are generally more suggestible than those of superior
cognitive abilities.” Gisli Gudjonsson, Theoretical and Empirical Aspects of Interrogative
Suggestibility in SUGGESTION AND SUGGESTIBILITY 141 (Gheorghiu et al. eds., 1989); see also
Fulero & Everington, supra note 187. This finding is also made with young suspects.
Fulero & Everington, supra note 187.
189
The leading piece is an excellent analysis. Morgan Cloud et al., Words Without
Meaning: The Constitution, Confessions, and Mentally Retarded Suspects, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 495
(2002).
190
The court in White v. State recognized that the defendant, with an I.Q. score of sixtyfour, was mildly retarded, but allowed his statement for he was advised of his rights and
he never requested an attorney. 465 S.E.2d 277 (Ga. 1996).
191
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wallen, 619 N.E.2d 365, 367 (Mass. App. 1993), where the
confession was found to be voluntary. The judges explained their decision:
185
186
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Impact of Videotaping

In the past decade, many police departments throughout the United
States have begun to videotape the interrogation process and resulting
confessions of suspects in custody.192 Some do it as a matter of policy;
others are directed to do so by judicial opinions.193 Also, just two years
ago, Illinois became the first state in the nation to enact a statute
requiring videotaping.194 Because these developments are so recent, the
impact of this new procedure in reported decisions and conviction
appeals are only now available.
Nothing appears from the record to indicate that the defendant was
unable to understand any of the procedures. While the judge found
that the defendant has an I.Q. between sixty and seventy, attained only
third or fourth grade reading and writing levels, and is able to
recognize few words of more than three syllables, he also found he
could read newspapers and write letters.
Id.
192
The United Kingdom has mandated such videotaping for a number of years. See John
Baldwin, Police Interview Techniques: Establishing Truth or Proof, 33 BRIT. J. CRIM. 325 (1993)
(discussing the practices there and in Australia); Slobogin, supra note 9 (arguing in favor of
a constitutional requirement of taping in the United States); Wayne Westling & Vicki Waye,
Videotaping Police Interrogations: Lessons from Australia, 25 AM. J. CRIM. L. 493 (1998).
Concerns as to the impact of videotaped statements are laid out in G. Daniel Lassiter et al.,
Accountability and the Camera Perspective Bias in Videotaped Confessions, in ANALYSES OF
SOCIAL ISSUES AND PUBLIC POLICY 53–70 (2001).
193
See, e.g., Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156 (Alaska 1985) (requiring recording under the
state constitution); State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587 (Minn. 1994) (mandating taping under
its supervisory power). In Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court—looking to its supervisory power regarding evidence at trials—decided that
if a confession was not videotaped, the jury could be instructed that the statement was to
be evaluated with “particular caution.” 813 N.E.2d 5 (Mass. 2004). A similar result was
reached in State v. Jerrell, 699 N.W.2d 110 (Wis. 2005), but it was limited to juveniles.
194
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/103-2.2 provides:
(b) An oral, written, or sign language statement of an accused made as
a result of a custodial interrogation at a police station or other place of
detention shall be presumed to be inadmissible as evidence against the
accused in any criminal proceeding . . . unless:
(1) an electronic recording is made of the custodial interrogation;
and
(2) the recording is substantially accurate and not intentionally
altered.
(c) Every electronic recording required under this Section must be
preserved until such time as . . . all . . . appeals are exhausted . . .
(d) If the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
defendant was subjected to a custodial interrogation in violation of this
Section, then any statements made by the defendant during or
following that non-recorded custodial interrogation. . . are presumed
to be inadmissible in any criminal proceeding against the defendant
except for the purposes of impeachment.
Id.
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The impact looks as if it will be substantial in two principal ways.
First, it will give judges a good look at the process to determine whether
improper techniques were employed during questioning. Judges can
determine for themselves that the process was not harsh and involved no
mistreatment195 or that inappropriate assurances or promises were made
to the suspect during the custodial period.196 Viewing a videotaped
interrogation is also quite helpful in determining the individual suspect’s
condition. Thus, judges are more able to conclude with some degree of
certainty that the accused either understood her rights and freely
spoke197 or was coerced into talking with the police.198 At this point the
number of reported cases exploring the role of videotaped interrogations
is limited, but that number is very likely to increase substantially over
the next several years.
5.

Miranda Warnings

Many commentators have asserted that Miranda is not the law
enforcement straightjacket that its critics claim.199 Indeed, this Article
and others have made the argument that the Miranda requirements are
an extremely important and positive tool for the police. That is, if
officers who are interrogating suspects in their custody carefully follow
the mandate of Miranda and clearly advise the suspects of their rights to
silence and a lawyer, few Fifth Amendment problems will follow in
admitting confessions.
The point extends even further. The same notion is true with respect
to the impact of the warnings in cases in which the defense’s claim of
inadmissibility rests on due process rather than privilege against selfincrimination. Courts have consistently found that the giving of Miranda
warnings is a relevant and significant factor in the totality-ofcircumstances analysis under the Due Process Clause.200 Additionally, in
State v. Getsy, 702 N.E.2d 866 (Ohio 1998).
State v. Baston, 928 P.2d 79 (Kan. 1996).
197
See Villa v. State, 721 N.E.2d 1272, 1275 (Ind. App. 1999); State v. Lamark, 584 So. 2d
686 (La. App. 1991); People v. Haywood, 530 N.W.2d 497 (Mich. App. 1995).
198
One of the most publicized cases involved Maryland defendant Richard Gater. The
basic facts of the case are laid out in the introductory section above. See Casteneda, supra
note 2.
199
See, e.g., Cloud et al., supra note 189; Steven D. Clymer, Are Police Free to Discard
Miranda, 112 YALE L.J. 447 (2002); Paul Marcus, A Return to the `Bright Line’ Rule of
Miranda, 35 WM. & MARY L.J. 93 (1993). For an excellent overview of the area, see WELSH S.
WHITE, MIRANDA’S WANING PROTECTIONS: POLICE INTERROGATION PRACTICES AFTER
DICKERSON (Univ. of Mich. Press 2001).
200
See, e.g., Lyons v. Luebbers, 403 F.3d 585, 596–97 (8th Cir. 2005); Roman v. State, 475
So. 2d 1228, 1232 (Fla. 1985); State v. Taillon, 470 N.W.2d 226, 229 (N.D. 1991); Jackson v.
195
196
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that analysis, the Miranda warnings are given heavy weight. Many cases
can be found throughout the nation—both federal and state—in which
confessions are held to be voluntary, with courts relying strongly on the
fact that the suspects were given Miranda warnings and appeared to
understand their constitutional rights.201
Once again, consistent statements of the law cannot be expected.
Just as some courts look to the Miranda warnings to find voluntary
statements, other courts discuss the warnings to conclude that improper
coercion took place. This conclusion is usually reached where either the
warnings were not given202 or the warnings were given and then the
officers disregarded the wishes of the suspect that she be given a lawyer
or not be interrogated.203 In the latter situation, the courts are rather
unforgiving of continual police questioning and will often find a
confession to be involuntary, wholly apart from any Fifth Amendment
considerations.204

Commonwealth, 590 S.E.2d 520 (Va. 2004). Of course, the giving of the warnings is no
guarantee that a later statement will be found to be voluntary, as we shall see, for the
“police [may then still use] fear, coercion, hope of reward, or some other improper
inducement.” State v. Cooper, 949 P.2d 660, 665 (N.M. 1997); see also Taillon, 470 N.W.2d
226.
201
The cases here are voluminous. See United States v. Gillaum, 355 F.3d 982, 990 (7th
Cir. 2004); Lucero v. Kerby, 133 F.3d 1299, 1310–11 (10th Cir. 1998); United States v. Jones,
32 F.3d 1512, 1517 (11th Cir. 1994); Bisbee v. State, 17 S.W.3d 477, 480 (Ark. 2000); People v.
Mays, 531 N.E.2d 1113, 1119 (Ill. App. 1988); State v. Franklin, 803 So. 2d 1057, 1067 (La.
App. 2001); Alexander v. State, 610 So. 2d 320, 327 (Miss. 1992); Licon v. State, 99 S.W.3d
918, 925 (Tex. App. 2003).
202
One court explained:
[T]he officers’ failure to administer Miranda warnings weighs against a
finding of voluntariness. As both parties point out, “[v]oluntariness
and Miranda are two separate inquiries.” This does not, however,
make a Miranda violation irrelevant to the issue of voluntariness. To
the contrary, in considering whether a person’s will was overborne
sufficiently to render a confession involuntary, the court should
consider whether the accused was advised of his or her constitutional
rights.
Although a failure to give Miranda warnings is not
determinative of voluntariness, the lack of warnings gives “added
weight” to other circumstances that make a confession involuntary.
State v. Pettit, 979 P.2d 5, 9 (Ariz. App. 1998). For a heated exchange on the significance of
the warnings, compare the majority and dissenting opinions in State v. Hoppe, 661 N.W.2d
407 (Wis. 2003).
203
See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 609 A.2d 1112 (D.C. App. 1992); Allan v. State, 38
P.3d 175, 178 (Nev. 2002).
204
The language of the court in People v. Neal, 72 P.3d 280, 291 (Cal. 2003), is particularly
harsh, for the justices there spoke of the police officer’s “misconduct . . . as ‘blatant
disregard’ of Miranda [which] is to understate its blameworthiness . . . .” Id.
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IV. APPLYING THE VOLUNTARINESS PRINCIPLE
The test today for voluntariness remains what it has been for more
than half a century: Judges “look at the totality of the circumstances of
the case in determining whether the confession was voluntary.”205 The
question in each case is whether the police action during the
interrogation “overb[ore] a suspect’s will.”206 Thus, one must ask
whether “the confessor did not make the decision to confess of his own
free will.”207 The determination is remarkably fact specific, with courts
looking at many factors in resolving claims under the Due Process
Clause.208 In order for the reader to have a full appreciation of how
difficult it would be to predict the result in a particular case209 and to see
the extremely limited precedential value of any judicial opinion in this
area,210 Part IV.A examines several illustrative cases.
A. The Voluntary Confession
The rule as applied in practice certainly is far from clear. For
instance, in one case the defendant was beaten by the police at the station
and he confessed.211 His testimony—not contradicted on the record—
205
State v. Barden, 572 S.E.2d 108, 124 (N.C. 2002). See generally Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d
1262, 1273 (9th Cir. 2005); Abela v. Martin, 380 F.3d 915, 928–29 (6th Cir. 2004).
206
Green v. Scully, 850 F.2d 894, 901 (2d Cir. 1988).
207
Hinton v. Snyder, 203 F. Supp. 2d 934, 941 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
208
The national record for the number of factors to be considered appears to go to the
Michigan state courts, which may, in one prosecution, rely upon fifteen to twenty such
items. See, e.g., People v. Wells, 605 N.W.2d 374, 377 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) (mentioning the
following: the age, education, and intelligence of the accused; his previous experience with
the police; the repeated nature and duration of the interrogation; the giving of Miranda
warnings; any unnecessary delay in bringing the accused before a magistrate; whether the
defendant was injured, intoxicated, or drugged; whether he was in ill health; whether the
accused was given food, sleep, or necessary medical attention; and whether he was abused
or threatened with abuse). Other noteworthy contenders include Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d
992, 1015–16 (9th Cir. 2004) (eight factors); United States v. Garot, 801 F.2d 1241, 1245 (10th
Cir. 1986) (seven factors); State v. Davis, 446 N.W.2d 785, 789 (Iowa 1989) (twelve factors);
and State v. Barden, 572 S.E.2d at 124–25 (N.C. 2002) (nine factors). See generally United
States v. Jones, 359 F.3d 921, 923–24 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. Haswood, 350 F.3d
1024, 1027–28 (9th Cir. 2003).
209
The one real exception here, as noted earlier, is the use of force by officers against the
suspect. See United States v. Jenkins, 938 F.2d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[C]onfessions
accompanied by physical violence wrought by the police have been considered per se
inadmissible.”); United States ex rel Hinton v. Snyder, 203 F. Supp. 2d 934, 941 (W.D. Ill.
2002) (“It is axiomatic that a confession extracted with violence or the threat of violence is
involuntary.”).
210
As the judges in Haswood properly wrote: “The totality of circumstances contains no
‘talismanic definition’ of voluntariness. Courts instead often consider [many] factors . . . .”
350 F.3d at 1027.
211
Holland v. McGinnis, 963 F.2d 1044 (7th Cir. 1992).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol40/iss3/4

Marcus: It's Not Just About Miranda: Determining the Voluntariness of Co

2006]

Voluntariness of Confessions

639

was that the officers “kicked, hit, and knocked [him] to the ground,
punched and beat[] [him] with a nightstick, raised [him] off the floor by
elevating his handcuffed arms behind him, and [pulled] his hair.”212
Thereafter, he was moved to a second police station where he confessed
again. The issue in the case was whether the second statement was
voluntary. The evidence showed that the defendant had remained in
custody throughout the process, did not speak with a lawyer, and did
not initiate the conversation that led to the later confession.
Nevertheless, the court found the second statement to be voluntary
because the second group of officers had not mistreated the accused, six
hours had passed between the two confessions, and the later
interrogation was conducted by different officers in a different police
station. As the court stated: “Any threat of physical mistreatment had
faded considerably in the interim; [defendant] must have recognized the
difference between [the two police stations] in terms of atmosphere and
the treatment accorded him by his interrogators.”213
In other cases, voluntariness is found with courts relying heavily on
the “fortitude” of the defendant in demanding her rights. In one case,
the demand was to see a search warrant,214 and in another case it was a
refusal to sign a written confession after an oral statement had been
made.215
In such instances, the judges looked at a variety of
circumstances in reaching their conclusions.216 For many judges,
Id. at 1047.
Id. at 1051. The court took into account the defendant’s “personal characteristics,
including his age, education, intelligence and prior experience with the police, in
determining whether he voluntarily tendered the [second] confession.” Id. at 1052. Also,
see State v. Hall, 369 S.E.2d 701, 704 (W. Va. 1988), where the confession was allowed even
though the defendant had, at the start, been beaten or kicked by the officers. The key for
the judges in that case was that thirteen days had passed between the beating and the
confession. This lag was viewed as “sufficient to dissipate the taint of coercion.” Id. at 705.
214
United States v. Rith, 164 F.3d 1323, 1333 (10th Cir. 1999).
215
People v. Williams, 627 N.Y.S.2d 781, 782 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995).
216
The factors are so specific to the particular prosecution that it is difficult to generalize
as to what will influence judges. United States v. Ceballos, 302 F.3d 679, 694 (7th Cir. 2002)
(analyzing a situation where a troubled defendant was twenty-four years old and there was
no evidence of a diminished mental capacity); McCall v. Dutton, 863 F.2d 454, 458 (6th Cir.
1988) (considering that weapons were shown but not pointed at the suspect); Lukehart v.
State, 776 So. 2d 906, 920 (Fla. 2000) (holding that sympathy elicited based on the
defendant’s religious beliefs did not “directly result” in the confession); State v.
Timmendequas, 737 A.2d 55, 110 (N.J. 1999) (allowing a statement where the suspect slept
only a few hours, but questioning was not “around the clock or continuous” and he was
allowed to go home briefly before being questioned again); State v. Terrazas, 4 S.W.3d 720,
726 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (considering a case where the accused was told by police “‘what
had to be’ in her statement,” which was not the sort of action viewed as inherently
coercive).
212
213
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deciding factors can be the defendant’s background,217 the fact that she
was alert and not sleep deprived,218 or that nothing about the accused’s
“age, sex, race, education, or physical or mental condition made him
susceptible to coercion.”219
B. The Involuntary Confession
Similar to the voluntary confessions, the legal principles applicable
to an involuntary confession are far from certain. In one case, the court
looked to an astonishingly large number of factors in finding the
confession coerced.220 The interrogation took sixteen hours, was
conducted by a “serial team,” the accused was not given a break, the
questions were “unabashedly leading,” the suspect was not permitted to
rest despite his requests, the officers refused to honor his requests under
Miranda, and the officers spoke to him about his history of blackouts as
casting doubt on his story.221
With such a rich assortment of
considerations, it appears impossible to suggest just what rule the case
stands for under the Due Process Clause.
Another recent case is similar. In State v. Marshall,222 a Minnesota
court struck down a confession, considering factors such as the failure to
advise the suspect of her Miranda rights; the fact that she was confronted
in her home by two officers, one of whom was armed; the officers’
discouraging of contact between the mother and her daughter; the
suspect becoming so emotionally wrought during the interrogation that
she stated that her “head [was] swimming”; the officers exploitation of
her religious beliefs;223 and the defendant not being allowed to eat.224

State v. Smith, 512 A.2d 189, 197 (Conn. 1986).
People v. Roybal, 55 P.3d 144, 147 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001).
219
State v. Sabinash, 574 N.W.2d 827, 829 (N.D. 1998). In State v. Harris, the defendant
was held for seven hours while he was shackled to the floor and prevented from using the
telephone. 105 P.3d 1258 (Kan. 2005). The court found the later confession to be voluntary
based upon a totality of circumstances analysis, especially focusing on the fact that the
defendant was twenty-four years old and had other juvenile felony convictions. Id. at 1264.
220
State v. Sawyer, 561 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 1990).
221
Id. at 290–91.
222
642 N.W.2d 48 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002).
223
For two Mississippi prosecutions using this religious reliance, see Carley v. State, 739
So. 2d 1046, 1053 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999) (“We are particularly troubled by the invocation of
the deity, discussion of Heaven and Hell, and the promise that ‘the truth sets you free’ to
induce a confession.”), and Abram v. State, 606 So. 2d 1015, 1033 (Miss. 1992). See also
Lukehart v. State, 776 So. 2d 906, 920 (Fla. 2000).
224
Marshall, 642 N.W.2d at 56. The court was sympathetic with the needs of the police,
but still found a due process violation:
217
218
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Such decisions defy any sort of ready formula for determining the
voluntariness of a confession. There are simply too many factors with
too narrow analyses to allow for any reasonable reliance by law
enforcement officers, judges, and lawyers. Also, of course, they are
joined by many other cases that consider a wide assortment of factors in
attempting to determine if a confession was improperly coerced.225 In
short, commentators who have cast doubt on the jurisprudence in this
important area appear correct. As one thoughtful observer gently and
generously put it:
Because the totality-of-the-circumstances test permits the
courts to weigh several factors together, it is not always
possible to determine which factors caused a court to
exclude or admit a confession, and courts rarely indicate
the relative importance of the factors that they use.226
This statement is unquestionably correct. The problem, of course, is
that the analysis is ultimately subjective, one which is fact specific to the
particular prosecution and defendant, recognizing “that the amount of
police pressure that is constitutional is not the same for each
defendant.”227

Police investigators face substantial obstacles in resolving an
investigation of a death that occurred almost twenty years ago;
confessions are one of the limited avenues available to them. But
incriminating statements produced by coercion are inherently
untrustworthy and undermine fundamental concepts of due process.
Id. at 56.
225
Judges have emphasized several factors in this analysis. See United States v. Perdue, 8
F.3d 1455, 1466 (10th Cir. 1993) (discussing force, either used or threatened); State v.
Coombs, 704 A.2d 387, 392 (Me. 1998) (addressing lack of breaks during interrogation);
State v. Mayes, 825 P.2d 1196, 1207 (Mont. 1992) (considering no sleep for the accused);
Passama v. State, 735 P.2d 321, 323 (Nev. 1987) (analyzing prolonged questioning of the
suspect); Marquez v. State, 890 P.2d 980, 986 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (applying promises of
a deal to the analysis); State v. Cochran, 696 P.2d 1114, 1121 (Or. Ct. App. 1985) (using
trickery as to the meaning of Miranda warnings); State v. Rettenberger, 984 P.2d 1009, 1019
(Utah 1999) (addressing the low I.Q. of the defendant). However, even in these cases,
several other significant factors were expressly relied upon by the courts.
226
Cloud et al., supra note 189, at 528.
227
State v. Hoppe, 661 N.W.2d 407, 415 (Wis. 2003). In Taylor v. Maddox, the confession
was found to be involuntary, with the court writing:
[The defendant’s] relative youth, the time of night when he was
questioned, the length of the interrogation, the absence of an attorney
or parent, the fact that he “was given no food, offered no rest break,
and may or many not have been given any water,” and the denial of
his requests to speak with his mother. . . .
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V. CONCLUSION
The rule regarding voluntariness remains a vital and perplexing
feature of the criminal justice system in the United States when
considering the admissibility of confessions. To be sure, the privilege
against self-incrimination in Miranda applies to many cases and disposes
of a good number of them. However, literally thousands of prosecutions
can be found throughout the country where serious due process
challenges are raised so that the government has to offer substantial
evidence to rebut the claim of constitutional violations.228 The legal test
truly does not vary much between jurisdictions. Prosecutors everywhere
must show that in making the confession, the criminal defendant made a
“free and unconstrained choice”229 and that the confession was “the
product of a rational intellect and free will and not the result of physical
abuse, psychological intimidation, or deceptive interrogation tactics that
have overcome the defendant’s free will.”230

366 F.3d 992, 1015 (9th Cir. 2004). See generally United States v. Lopez, 437 F.3d 1059 (10th
Cir. 2006); Edwards v. State, 842 P.2d 1281, 1284 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992); Lam v. Kelchner,
304 F.3d 256, 267 (3d Cir. 2002); Martin v. State, 686 A.2d 1130, 1143 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1996); State v. Knight, 849 A.2d 209, 219 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 2004).
228
The federal courts use a preponderance of the evidence standard as set forth by the
Supreme Court in Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972). Many states follow this standard.
See State v. Lacy, 929 P.2d 1288 (Ariz. 1996); Sliney v. State, 699 So. 2d 662 (Fla. 1997);
Aguilar v. State, 751 P.2d 178 (N.M. 1988); State v. Hoehne, 989 P.2d 469 (Or. Ct. App.
1999); Hernandez v. State, 952 S.W.2d 59 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); State v. Aten, 927 P.2d 210
(Wash. 1996); State v. Wilson, 439 S.E.2d 448 (W. Va. 1993); Edwards v. State, 973 P.2d 41
(Wyo. 1999). Other states use a reasonable doubt test. See Henry v. State, 738 N.E.2d 663
(Ind. 2000); State v. Leonard, 605 So. 2d 697 (La. App. 1992); State v. McCarthy, 819 A.2d
335 (Me. 2003); Commonwealth v. Judge, 650 N.E.2d 1242 (Mass. 1995); Moody v. State, 841
So. 2d 1067 (Miss. 2003); State v. Hammond, 742 A.2d 532 (N.H. 1999); People v.
Williamson, 667 N.Y.S.2d 114 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997); State v. Corder, 460 N.W.2d 733 (S.D.
1990). Rhode Island appears to require the prosecution to make the showing of
voluntariness by clear and convincing evidence. State v. Apalakis, 797 A.2d 440, 447 (R.I.
2002).
229
State v. Bowers, 661 N.W.2d 536, 541 (Iowa 2003); see also Steese v. State, 960 P.2d 321,
327 (Nev. 1998).
230
United States v. Abdullah, 294 F.3d 830, 836 (7th Cir. 2002). For a less than wholly
convinced view of this standard in practice, see Judge Posner’s opinion for the court in
United States v. Rutledge:
The courts in such cases retreat to the proposition that a confession, to
be admissible, must be the product of a free choice . . . [but this] leads
nowhere. Taken seriously it would require the exclusion of virtually
all fruits of custodial interrogation, since few choices to confess can be
thought truly “free” when made by a person who is incarcerated and is
being questioned by armed officers without the presence of counsel or
anyone else to give him moral support. The formula is not taken
seriously.
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Yet, the clarity of the test as stated is in sharp contrast to its
application in practice. The reality is that few criteria stand out as
especially significant, and even fewer appellate decisions can be viewed
as establishing noteworthy precedents. The due process test offers
almost no guidance for lawyers and judges.231
This Article has considered thousands of opinions on confessions
from the past two decades. One necessarily comes away with a feeling
of being unclean and tainted by government activities that are not
honorable even given the environment needed for interrogations. Many
judges allow confessions into evidence in cases in which police
interrogators lied and threatened defendants or played on the mental,
emotional, or physical weaknesses of suspects. While judges write that
they do not condone such conduct232 and find such practices
repugnant,233 reprehensible,234 or deplorable,235 some of those same
judges have upheld the admission of such confessions that result from
those practices after applying the totality of circumstances test.236

900 F.2d 1127, 1129 (7th Cir. 1996).
231
This critical view is shared by other commentators. Professor Welsh White wrote that
“the due process test provides few safeguards against the admission of untrustworthy
confessions.” Welsh S. White, False Confessions and the Constitution: Safeguards Against
Untrustworthy Confessions, 32 HARV. C. R.-C. L. L. REV. 105, 117 (1997). He explained
further:
Interrogators are not permitted to use overtly coercive tactics such as
insisting on an answer after the suspect has indicated a desire to
remain silent; moreover, they may not use direct or indirect threats of
violence, nor interrogate suspects continuously for thirty-six hours.
Interrogators are not prohibited, however, from questioning suspects
for a considerable period and employing a wide array of interrogation
tactics, including trickery, to induce a confession.
Id.; see also Sherry F. Colb, Why the Supreme Court Should Overrule the Massiah Doctrine and
Permit Miranda Alone to Govern Interrogations (2001), http://writ.corporate.findlaw.com/
colb/20010509.html. In Colb’s article, she stated:
“[V]oluntariness” was the original standard for deciding whether a
confession had been exacted in violation of the Fifth Amendment. But
it was an amorphous standard. Courts found themselves bogged
down in factual determinations about suspects’ free will in each case.
It was difficult to predict in advance which confessions would become
evidence, and which would be suppressed.
Id.
232
Luckhart v. State 736 N.E.2d 227, 231 (Ind. 2000).
233
Ex parte Hill, 557 So. 2d 838, 842 (Ala. 1989).
234
United States v. Orso, 266 F.3d 1030, 1039 (9th Cir. 2001).
235
State v. Register, 476 S.E.2d 153, 158 (S.C. 1996).
236
Two recent cases illustrate the point well. In United States v. LeBrun, the interrogating
officers “interrupted [the defendant] in a bullying manner and demonstrated a threatening
kind of impatience with him” and seemingly promised him he would not be prosecuted if
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I began by asking two questions: (1) How important are the due
process rules today now that we have lived for almost forty years with
Miranda?, and (2) Have these principles improved at all in practice from
the muddled mess found prior to the Chief Justice’s opinion there? The
strong belief I have formed is that the rules are most important and are
widely applied in the twenty-first century, they are just as poorly and
inconsistently applied as they were in the 1950s and 1960s. In
comparison, the imprecisely bright line rules of Miranda look very good.

he confessed to spontaneously killing the victim. 363 F.3d 715, 727 (8th Cir. 2004) (Arnold,
J., dissenting). The confession was allowed into evidence. The confession was also
permitted in Knight v. State, though the officer gave the suspect “the impression that
probation was a possibility, and that [the officer] could make things either difficult or easy
for him by recommending bond.” 971 S.W.2d 272 (Ark. App. 1998) (Rogers, J., dissenting).
In both cases, the majority looked to a multitude of factors in determining that no due
process violation had occurred. Cf. Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 813 A.2d 516 (Mass.
2004) (disallowing a confession because the interrogating officers seemed to sympathize
with the suspect, telling him that the crime was understandable and perhaps even
justifiable). The court reasoned that “[r]esearch suggests that such ‘minimization’ of the
crime by an interrogator implies leniency if the suspect will adopt that minimized version
of the crime, and that leniency can thereby be implicitly offered even if it is not expressly
stated as a quid pro quo for the confession.” Id. at 526.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol40/iss3/4

